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AN ANTITRUST NARCOTIC: 
HOW THE RULE OF REASON IS LULLING 
VERTICAL ENFORCEMENT TO SLEEP 
Nicole McGuire* 
Over time, the Supreme Court has adopted a laissez faire attitude 
toward antitrust enforcement, which now threatens to end vertical 
enforcement altogether. Since the inception of the Sherman Act, the 
Court has limited the application of Section 1 to only those contracts 
that endorse unreasonable restraints on trade. In doing so, the Court 
voiced a preference for using the defendant-friendly rule of reason over 
the strict per se standard when determining reasonableness. Then in 
2007, the Court took the final step in relaxing vertical enforcement by 
mandating that courts evaluate all vertical restraints under the rule of 
reason. Regrettably, the rule of reason often amounts to per se 
nonliability in practice, thereby frustrating the very objectives that the 
Sherman Act was enacted to protect. This Article argues that the Court, 
through its leniency toward vertical enforcement and its failure to 
provide sufficient guidance about how to apply the rule of reason, has 
endorsed per se legality for all vertical restraints. It then proposes that 
in order to resume an optimal level of enforcement, the rule of reason 
should be replaced by a rebuttable presumption of illegality. 
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“Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic 
power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; 
that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a 
stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is 
necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough 
alone.” Judge Learned Hand
1
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Promoting competition and implementing a free-market system 
are generally accepted in the United States as the best ways to 
allocate resources and eliminate economic waste.
2
 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has even gone so far as to say that competition in the free 
market “provid[es] an environment conducive to the preservation of 
our democratic political and social institutions.”
3
 Simultaneously, the 
government has always been concerned with too much centralized 
economic power, monopolies in particular,
4
 fearing that efficiency 
and consumer welfare are sacrificed when private businesses are 
allowed to operate, unregulated, in the free market.
5
 To prevent 
excessive centralized power, the government has developed 
protections in the form of antitrust laws. The primary purpose of U.S. 
antitrust laws is to eliminate conduct that could prove detrimental to 
competition, consumers, and the free market.
6
 However, effective 
antitrust laws must strike a balance between favoring a competitive, 
 
 1. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 2. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“[T]he unrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the 
highest quality and the greatest material progress . . . .”); ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE 
REGULATION 2 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 6th ed. 2010). 
 3. N. Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4. 
 4. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 1; see also Christopher S. Kelly, Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: The Final Blow to the Use of the Per Se Rules in Judging 
Vertical Restraints—Why the Court Got It Wrong, 28 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 593, 595 (2008) (“By the 
late nineteenth century, . . . [i]t was feared that if economic power was concentrated in the hands 
of a select few, additional concentration of market power would naturally occur, and would result 
in trusts that would use their power to oppress individuals and injure the public.”). 
 5. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. 
 6. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (quoting 
Standard Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)) (“The Sherman Act reflects a 
legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also 
better goods and services. ‘The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the 
value of competition.’”). 
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free market economy and eliminating the excessive power that such 
an economy has the potential to generate. 
When Congress created antitrust enforcement by passing 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it recognized the importance of 
maintaining this balance by stating that “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with 
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.”
7
 The Supreme 
Court has since limited the scope of the Sherman Act by declaring 
that Section 1 should not be interpreted so broadly as to apply to all 
contracts, but instead should apply to only those that impose 
unreasonable restraints on trade.
8
 In light of this interpretation, the 
Court has repeatedly stated that courts should favor the “rule of 
reason” when determining the reasonableness, and thereby the 
legality, of a restraint.
9
 The rule of reason enables the fact-finder to 
consider all of the circumstances surrounding a restraint, including 
its procompetitive justifications.
10
 In this way, the standard is 
supposed to assist the fact-finder in deciding whether a particular 
restraint is in fact unreasonable in violation of Section 1.
11
 
Particularly, the Court has emphasized the use of the rule of 
reason in cases where the adverse economic impact of a specific 
restraint is not obvious because the rule allows courts to scrutinize 
that impact to determine whether the restraint actually stifles 
competition.
12
 The Court departs from the rule of reason approach in 
favor of a per se standard only when it faces a class of restraints that 
has the tendency to always, or almost always, decrease competition 
or output.
13
 The per se standard requires no investigation into the 
nature and impact of a restraint; instead the restraint is declared 
illegal at the outset.
14
 
 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 8. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (quoting 
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)). 
 9. Id. at 885–86. 
 10. Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1375, 1379 (2009). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 885–86. 
 13. Id. at 886 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988)). 
 14. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust 
Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1214 (2008); Stucke, supra note 10, at 1378–79; see also 
infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the mechanics of the per se rule). 
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Nevertheless, even after it declared a particular class of 
restraints to be per se illegal, the Court has maintained that it 
reserves the freedom to change the appropriate standard to the rule of 
reason in any subsequent decision where economic and practical 
realities justify the switch.
15
 The Court has demonstrated its freedom 
to change the standard of analysis throughout the evolution of 
antitrust enforcement in what has been referred to as a “pattern of 
reflexive condemnations.”
16
 Whenever a state-of-the-art business 
practice emerges, and its competitive impact is not yet understood, 
courts immediately assume that the practice is contrary to 
competitive ideals and condemn it as per se illegal. Then, when the 
underlying efficiency explanations prove to be adequate 
justifications for the practice, courts ditch the per se standard in favor 
of the rule of reason.
17
 The impact of this pattern is a tendency 
toward false positives—findings of illegal conduct when there has 
been no actual harm to competition.
18
 Only after extensive economic 
analysis of the procompetitive justifications is the practice eventually 
evaluated according to the rule of reason.
19
 
Despite this self-proclaimed grant of power to change the 
standard of analysis, the Court has never identified a standard other 
than the per se rule and the rule of reason.
20
 There is, of course, the 
“quick look” rule of reason, which shifts the initial burden of proof 
from the plaintiff, who no longer has to define the proper market, to 
the defendant, who must demonstrate the procompetitive benefits of 
the restraint.
21
 However, the quick-look approach has been criticized 
as a pared down version of the rule of reason, offering no novelty or 
clarity to the analysis.
22
 In fact, courts often choose to defer to a full 
 
 15. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 899–900; see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1997) 
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(stating that stare decisis “is not an inexorable command” and that when “the theoretical 
underpinnings of [earlier] decisions are called into serious question” because of changes in 
economic circumstances and increased experience evaluating the relevant circumstances, the 
Court should reconsider “its decisions construing the Sherman Act”). 
 16. Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust, Economics and Innovation in the Obama Administration, 
GCP: THE ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov. 2009, at 2, available at http://www.techpolicyinstitute.org/ 
files/wright-nov09.pdf. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1408–09. 
 21. Id. at 1410. 
 22. See id. at 1411–15. 
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rule of reason analysis instead of utilizing the quick-look approach.
23
 
In essence, the quick-look approach is no longer a distinct standard 
but rather has become a shortcut for a full rule of reason analysis.
24
 
Inexorably, the Supreme Court has not entertained a new 
standard of analysis or elaborated on how to accurately apply the rule 
of reason; instead it has flip-flopped between the per se standard and 
the rule of reason.
25
 Unfortunately, this approach does nothing to 
resolve the problems imposed by the standards as they currently 
exist, and it has only increased uncertainty in the law.
26
 By 
continuously failing to clarify the rule of reason or to implement a 
new, clearer standard, the Court seems to be hoping that the lower 
courts will miraculously generate an accurate and workable standard 
from the vague rule of reason it created.
27
 This is particularly 
unsettling because the rule of reason is often criticized for being, in 
application, “little more than a euphemism for nonliability.”
28
 
Nonliability can frustrate antitrust objectives because as enforcement 
wanes, businesses are permitted to act, unchecked, in their own self-
interest.
29
 As a result, competition is likely to suffer and, inevitably, 
consumers are forced to pay higher prices.
30
 
This Article argues that the Supreme Court is dangerously close 
to rendering vertical restraints legal per se. This approach to per se 
legality is largely due to the Supreme Court’s mandate in Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
31
which required courts 
to apply the rule of reason in all vertical-restraint cases but provided 
no clear guidance about how to apply the rule. Three factors 
contribute to vertical restraints’ succumbing to per se legality: (1) 
 
 23. Id. at 1413–15. 
 24. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1219. Indeed, the quick look rule of reason never 
quite caught on in the context of vertical restraints and has since lost its traction as a favorable 
standard for other types of restraints as well. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1413. 
 25. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1408–09. 
 26. Jordan A. Dresnick & Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Vertical Price Agreements in the 
Wake of Leegin v. PSKS: Where Do We Stand Now?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229, 249–50 (2009) 
(explaining how the Court’s failure to elaborate on the proper application of the rule of reason in 
Leegin will lead to uncertainty in the lower court’s application of the rule). 
 27. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1490. 
 28. Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the 
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977). 
 29. Pamela Jones Harbour, Vertical Restraints: Federal and State Enforcement of Vertical 
Issues, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: PRODUCT DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING, Mar. 17–19, 
2005, at 3–4, available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/050329vertical.pdf. 
 30. Id. 
 31. 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
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when courts apply Leegin in conjunction with Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly,
32
 plaintiffs are rarely able to survive the pleading stages; 
(2) courts are reluctant to acknowledge when vertical restraints are 
being used as a guise for horizontal conduct unless the horizontal 
collusion is obvious; and (3) the lower courts are not able to perform 
reliable economic analyses of vertical restraints using the rule of 
reason under the current modus operandi. This Article contends that 
because these factors rarely have led the lower courts to find that a 
plaintiff has successfully alleged a violation of Section 1, these 
factors have, in effect, caused vertical restraints to come closer to per 
se legality than ever. 
Ultimately, this Article proposes adopting a rebuttable-
presumption-of-illegality standard for evaluating all vertical 
restraints on trade. This standard would garner more success for 
plaintiffs while preserving the Court’s desire to consider the 
economic justifications for imposing restraints. While courts might 
consider this to be a dramatic shift from the current standard, the 
Court’s shift to the rule of reason has spurred the desertion of vertical 
enforcement. Thus, in order to prevent a de facto standard of per se 
legality, the Court must take action by articulating a comprehensible 
standard for evaluating whether a vertical restraint constitutes an 
antitrust violation. 
Part II of this Article identifies the need for vertical 
enforcement, defines the different types of vertical restraints, 
explains the differences between the per se and rule of reason 
standards, and tracks the Court’s enforcement of vertical restraints 
from their per se origins through the adoption of the rule of reason. 
Part III evaluates how the lower courts are currently handling 
vertical-restraint cases under the rule of reason and explores whether, 
as a result, vertical restraints have been rendered legal per se. Part IV 
then proposes that the Court consider replacing the rule of reason 
approach with a rebuttable-presumption-of-illegality standard to 
evaluate whether an alleged violation constitutes an unreasonable 
restraint on competition. Finally, Part V concludes that the Supreme 
Court has gone too far by declaring that all vertical restraints be 
subject to the rule of reason—thereby causing vertical enforcement 
 
 32. 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (raising the pleading standard for a plaintiff alleging an antitrust 
violation); see infra Part III.A. 
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levels to become suboptimal—and that to correct this misstep the 
Court must institute a new standard. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
For purposes of determining their legality under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, restraints on trade are categorized as either vertical or 
horizontal.
33
 Vertical restraints arise when an entity in the chain of 
distribution, typically a manufacturer, imposes restrictions on an 
entity at a different level within the chain, usually a retailer.
34
 
Horizontal restraints, on the other hand, arise when an entity enters 
into an agreement with a competitor at the same level of the 
distribution chain to eliminate competition.
35
 Vertical restraints are 
generally considered less threatening to antitrust ideals than 
horizontal restraints because they do not eliminate competition in the 
same way horizontal restraints do.
36
 Horizontal restraints are more 
likely than vertical restraints to eliminate interbrand competition
37
—
competition between sellers offering similar but distinct products 
under different brand names.
38
 Vertical restraints, on the other hand, 
more commonly reduce intrabrand competition
39
—competition 
between entities promoting the same brand of a certain product.
40
 
While the elimination of intrabrand competition may be less 
disconcerting than the elimination of interbrand competition, 
intrabrand competition is not completely innocuous, and for this 
reason, the current level of vertical enforcement is troubling. 
 
 33. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1219. 
 34. Id. This Article will discuss both price and nonprice vertical restraints. See infra Part 
II.B. 
 35. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1219. 
 36. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 888 (citing to Arizona v. Maricopa 
Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1982) (“[H]orizontal restraints are generally less 
defensible than vertical restraints.”); Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1219; see also infra 
notes 150–153 and accompanying text (stating that one of the Court’s main reasons for 
overturning the per se standard in Leegin was the difference between the procompetitive 
justifications for the two types of restraints). 
 37. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104–07 (1984) (explaining that a decrease in 
horizontal competitors was one anticompetitive consequence of a horizontal agreement). 
 38. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 264. 
 39. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977). 
 40. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 264 n.369. 
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A.  Conflicting Interests and 
the Need for Vertical Enforcement 
Vertical antitrust enforcement is thought to be essential for 
encouraging competition and protecting consumers because 
consumers’ best interests usually do not coincide with the interests of 
those imposing the restraints.
41
 The Supreme Court has advised that 
the antitrust laws should be interpreted in a way that protects 
interbrand competition more than intrabrand competition, and, as a 
result, restraints impacting interbrand competition should be more 
carefully scrutinized.
42
 Nonetheless, eliminating intrabrand 
competition elicits antitrust concerns because it is questionable 
whether businesses can act as an effective surrogate for consumers’ 
best interests—frequently, eliminating intrabrand competition leads 
to higher prices for consumers.
43
 
Vertical restraints are most utilized by manufacturers.
44
 Often, 
manufacturers decide to develop a chain of distribution, “a network 
of independent intermediate distributors and retail outlets,” rather 
than to sell products directly to the end consumer.
45
 This distribution 
chain is made up of numerous entities, each seeking to maximize 
profits.
46
 Once a manufacturer sells a good, whether to a dealer or 
directly to a consumer, it has collected all the profit possible from 
that particular sale.
47
 As a result, a manufacturer may want to act in 
its own self-interest and choose to limit the degree and nature of 
intrabrand competition—competition between its dealers—by 
imposing vertical restraints.
48
 Vertical restraints make it possible for 
manufacturers to control the market after the initial sale of the 
good.
49
 In other words, vertical restraints enable a manufacturer to 
ensure that its dealers will act in accordance with the manufacturer’s 
best interest.
50
 Other common reasons for imposing vertical restraints 
include stimulating interbrand competition, increasing the 
 
 41. Id. at 238. 
 42. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890 (2007). 
 43. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 608. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. at 606. 
 46. Harbour, supra note 29, at 3–4. 
 47. Id. 
 48. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 606. 
 49. See id. 
 50. Id. at 606–07. 
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availability of customer services, and facilitating entry into the 
market for new competitors.
51
 
Regrettably, despite their appeal to manufacturers, vertical 
restraints can threaten competition and thus raise antitrust concerns 
for other entities in the chain of distribution, particularly 
consumers.
52
 Vertical restraints not only force consumers to pay 
higher prices for the same goods and services without receiving any 
additional benefits,
53
 but they also limit dealers’ profit margins 
because dealers no longer have the power to set their own prices. In 
addition, oftentimes vertical restraints facilitate cartel formation and 
market-power abuse, leading to higher prices for consumers.
54
 This 
is often a result of conflicting interests.
55
 Manufacturers prefer a 
decrease in intrabrand competition and an increase in interbrand 
competition, and vertical restraints enable manufacturers to realize 
this penchant. Unfortunately, consumers’ best interests are not 
aligned with this preference, as an increase in both intrabrand and 
interbrand competition is most beneficial to consumers.
56
 
Consumer benefit is calculated relative to the number of options 
available when purchasing a good, and the availability of options is 
proportional to the quantity of intrabrand and interbrand 
competition.
57
 When the Court chose to subject all vertical restraints 
to the rule of reason in Leegin, it relied both on the appraisal that 
interbrand competition is more valuable to the free market than 
intrabrand competition and on the belief that vertical restraints, 
 
 51. Jessica L. Taralson, Note, What Would Sherman Do? Overturning the Per Se Illegality 
of Minimum Vertical Price Restraints Under the Sherman Act in Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. Was Not as Reasonable as It Seemed, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 549, 
568–69 (2008); see also Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (“[N]ew 
manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce 
competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is 
often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer. Established 
manufacturers can use them to induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide 
service and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of their products. Service and 
repair are vital for many products . . . . The availability and quality of such services affect a 
manufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of his product. Because of market 
imperfections . . . these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive 
situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services 
than if none did.”). 
 52. Harbour, supra note 29, at 3–4. 
 53. Id. at 3. 
 54. Taralson, supra note 51, at 569. 
 55. See Harbour, supra note 29, at 7. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
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specifically minimum resale-price maintenance,
58
 promote interbrand 
competition by encouraging manufacturers to compete for customers 
on more than just lower prices.
59
 Attractive storefronts and customer 
service, for example, become more important to product 
differentiation when prices are stabilized.
60
 
When it valued interbrand above intrabrand competition, the 
Court suggested that manufacturers would effectively act as 
fiduciaries for consumers when it imposed vertical restraints on its 
retailers.
61
 But this inevitably begs the question of whether 
manufacturers’ interests truly align with those of consumers.
62
 
Justice Breyer is skeptical.
63
 In his dissent in Leegin, he recognized 
the potential for anticompetitive consequences to materialize as 
intrabrand competition dwindles.
64
 Justice Breyer was apprehensive 
of minimum resale-price maintenance because it can incentivize 
dealers to charge higher prices, can fail to respond to changes in 
demand, and can sacrifice efficiency and innovation.
65
 He was also 
worried that minimum resale-price maintenance would trigger 
horizontal conspiracies because tacit collusion among manufacturers 
is more likely to occur when pricing behavior is easily monitored.
66
 
In Leegin, the majority dismissed the argument that consumers were 
harmed by the higher prices resulting from minimum resale-price 
maintenance.
67
 Instead, it assumed that all dealers would be induced 
to compete by offering additional customer service and that all 
consumers were willing to sacrifice lower price for increased 
 
 58. Minimum resale price maintenance is the practice where manufacturers set the lowest 
price at which its retailers are permitted to charge consumers for a product. See infra note 74 and 
accompanying text. 
 59. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 238 & n.91 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 
19–20, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480), 
2007 WL 160780, at *19–20). 
 60. See id. at 238–39 (explaining that vertical price restraints force retailers “to compete on 
more than mere price” by offering extra incentives like “customer service and an attractive 
presentation”). 
 61. See id. at 238 & n.87 (explaining how increased interbrand competition ultimately 
benefits consumers); see also PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 608 (suggesting that 
manufacturers could be thought of as surrogates for consumers’ interests). 
 62. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 608. 
 63. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 915 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[R]esale price maintenance can 
cause harms with some regularity—and certainly when dealers are the driving force.”). 
 64. Id. at 910–11. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 911. 
 67. Id. at 895–96 (majority opinion). 
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service.
68
 In doing so, the majority failed to acknowledge that these 
suppositions are not always true. The end result is that, regardless of 
what complimentary services dealers offer to compensate for higher 
prices, when a manufacturer demands that its retailers engage in 
minimum price fixing, consumers pay the price—literally.
69
 
Regrettably, the majority in Leegin may have gravely 
underestimated the importance of intrabrand competition, and market 
realities demonstrate that the relationship between interbrand and 
intrabrand competition is, at the very least, more complex than the 
majority acknowledged.
70
 The bottom line is that while eliminating 
interbrand competition may be more damaging to competition, 
consumers benefit most when both interbrand and intrabrand 
competition are exhibited in the market.
71
 
B.  Price vs. Nonprice: 
Breaking Down Vertical Restraints 
Vertical restraints can be classified into two basic categories: 
price restraints and nonprice restraints.
72
 Price and nonprice 
restraints, although seemingly distinct, are often difficult to 
differentiate for categorization purposes because they “generally 
occur under similar circumstances and have an almost identical 
economic impact.”
73
 Usually, vertical price restraints take the form 
of price-fixing agreements, also known as resale-price maintenance, 
and they surface when a seller sets a specific price—a price ceiling 
 
 68. See id. at 891 (“If the consumer can then buy the product from a retailer that discounts 
because it has not spent capital providing services or developing a quality reputation, the high-
service retailer will lose sales to the discounter, forcing it to cut back its services to a level lower 
than consumers would otherwise prefer. Minimum resale price maintenance alleviates the 
problem because it prevents the discounter from undercutting the service provider.”). 
 69. Note, Leegin’s Unexplored “Change in Circumstance”: The Internet and Resale Price 
Maintenance, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1600, 1605 (2008) [hereinafter Change in Circumstance] 
(quoting Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule 
Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1488 (1983)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“[T]he one point that emerges clearly in any debate concerning the per se rule is that 
minimum vertical price agreements lead to higher, and usually uniform, resale prices.”). 
 70. See infra notes 321–337 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Harbour, supra note 29, at 7. 
 72. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1224. 
 73. Taralson, supra note 51, at 568; see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 
U.S. 717, 727–28 (1988) (discussing the possibility of using vertical nonprice restraints to set 
prices). 
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(maximum resale price maintenance) or a price floor (minimum 
resale price maintenance)—at which a buyer may resell the good.
74
 
Nonprice vertical restraints include a much broader array of 
restraints, including customer and territorial restrictions, channel of 
distribution restraints, exclusive dealing or distributor agreements, 
and tying arrangements.
75
 Customer and territorial restraints occur 
when a supplier or manufacturer mandates that a distributor may not 
sell outside of an assigned geographic territory or a particular 
demographic of customers.
76
 For instance, in order to eliminate 
competition among its retailers, a gasoline supplier may set different 
territorial boundaries for each retailer outside of which each is 
prohibited from selling gasoline to consumers. A channel-of-
distribution restraint results when a supplier or manufacturer requires 
a distributor to sell solely within a designated “channel of 
distribution.”
77
 Any means by which a good reaches a consumer is 
considered a channel of distribution; this includes all intermediate 
entities in the chain of distribution and even extends to situations in 
which entities decide to utilize the Internet.
78
 For example, a 
manufacturer of expensive designer watches may want to protect the 
brand’s high-end reputation by prohibiting distributors from selling 
the watches in wholesale stores or over the Internet. Exclusive 
dealing arrangements arise when a buyer agrees to buy products or 
 
 74. LAWRENCE FULLERTON ET AL., GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: VERTICAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE REGULATION OF DISTRIBUTION PRACTICES IN 34 JURISDICTIONS 
WORLDWIDE 210 (Stephen Kinsella ed., 2008). 
 75. Id. A tying arrangement exists when a seller agrees to sell a product to a buyer, but only 
if the buyer also purchases another product from the seller. Id. While this Article is limited to 
enforcement under Section 1, it should be noted that tying arrangements can also be evaluated 
under section 3 of the Clayton Act, which has a quasi per se analysis. See Daniel E. Lazaroff, 
Reflections on Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.: Continued Confusion 
Regarding Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Jurisprudence, 69 WASH. L. REV. 101, 106 (1994). 
Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is interesting that courts are increasingly considering 
the business justifications for tying arrangements, which shows a preference for a rule of reason 
type analysis. FULLERTON ET AL., supra note 74, at 212. For a more comprehensive discussion 
and history of antitrust enforcement of tying arrangements, see PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 
859; United States v. Loew’s Incorporated, 371 U.S. 38, 44–47 (1962); Jefferson Parish Hospital 
District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–18 (1984); Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical 
Services., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461–62 (1992); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 
547 U.S. 28, 33–43 (2006). 
 76. See FULLERTON ET AL., supra note 74, at 210. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Distribution Channel Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/distribution+channel (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (defining 
distribution channel as “a way of selling a company’s product either directly or via distributors”). 
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services exclusively from one seller for a specific period of time.
79
 
Similarly, exclusive distributorship arrangements arise when a 
manufacturer agrees that a distributor will have the sole right to sell 
products or goods in a certain geographic area.
80
 
C.  Standards for Analysis: 
Per Se and Rule of Reason 
As a consequence of the Supreme Court’s effort to limit the 
scope of the Sherman Act to prohibit only those restraints which 
unreasonably restrain competition, the Supreme Court has developed 
two primary standards of analysis: the per se standard and the rule of 
reason.
81
 
1.  The Per Se Standard 
The Court has consistently held that the per se standard applies 
to agreements that “because of their pernicious effect on competition 
and lack of any redeeming virtue” yield an irrebuttable presumption 
of unreasonableness.
82
 In effect, a court presumes, without 
conducting an economic analysis or considering procompetitive 
defenses, that certain conduct is unreasonable and, therefore, illegal 
per se.
83
 Implicit in a per se designation is the presumption that any 
underlying business reasons for imposing a restraint will always be 
less significant than the restraint’s detriment to competition and, 
therefore, need not be considered by the court.
84
 The finality of a per 
se classification is severe, in that once a restraint is found to fall into 
a class of restraints subject to the per se standard, it is automatically 
declared to be illegal.
85
 The impact of this classification on the 
outcome of litigation is unmistakable—once a plaintiff proves that 
 
 79. See FULLERTON ET AL., supra note 74, at 210. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1212. 
 82. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. 
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (“We have said that per se rules are appropriate 
only for ‘conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive,’ that is, conduct ‘that would always or 
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.’” (citations omitted)). 
 83. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1213–14; see also Stucke, supra note 10, at 1379 
(“Under the per se rule, once a plaintiff proves an agreement among competitors to engage in the 
prohibited conduct, the plaintiff wins.”). 
 84. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1213–14. 
 85. Id. 
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competitors agreed to engage in conduct that is illegal per se, the 
plaintiff wins.
86
 
2.  The Rule of Reason 
In contrast to the per se standard, the rule of reason is a flexible 
standard that requires the fact-finder to consider all of the 
circumstances in each case to determine whether the conduct is an 
unreasonable restraint on competition.
87
 Legality, under the rule of 
reason, is a question of whether the restraint “merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may 
suppress or even destroy competition.”
88
 To answer that question, the 
court must consider several factors, including the facts surrounding 
the type of business in which the restraint applies, the business’s 
economic condition before and after the restraint became effective, 
the nature of the restraint, and the restraint’s actual or probable 
economic impact.
89
 In addition, the court should take into account 
the “history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for 
adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end sought to be 
attained . . . .”
90
 After evaluating all of these considerations, the court 
then determines what the net competitive effect of the restraint is by 
balancing the procompetitive justifications against the 
anticompetitive implications.
91
 
Another difference between the standards is that the rule of 
reason imposes a heightened burden on plaintiffs.
92
 Under both 
standards, the plaintiff must first prove the existence of an agreement 
among competitors.
93
 In rule of reason cases, however, the plaintiff 
must then affirmatively prove that the restraint unreasonably restricts 
competition.
94
 That is, the court will not assume unreasonableness, as 
 
 86. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1379. 
 87. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
 88. Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. While good intentions cannot save unreasonable restraints on trade, knowledge of 
intent can help the court to interpret the circumstances and predict economic consequences. Id. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See, e.g., Richard Liebeskind & Joseph R. Tiffany, Two Years After Leegin, Questions 
Remain on Lawfulness of Resale Price Maintenance, July 31, 2009, at 2, available at http:// 
www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/053986E13BCE687E8E0CA54E89372048.pdf 
(“Leegin’s reasonableness requirement makes the already heightened Twombly standard even 
more rigorous in RPM cases.”). 
 93. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1385. 
 94. See id. at 1385. 
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it does in the context of a per se analysis.
95
 Rather, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate an actual or potential anticompetitive impact in the 
market and generally must also show that the defendant possesses 
market power.
96
 If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden of proof, 
the defendant can then provide procompetitive justifications for 
imposing the restraint.
97
 If the defendant is able to do so, the plaintiff 
once again shoulders the burden of proving that that the restraint is 
not reasonably necessary.
98
 If the plaintiff is able to prove this, the 
court will then consider whether the anticompetitive effects of the 
restraint outweigh the procompetitive justifications.
99
 Only if the 
court finds that the procompetitive benefits do not outweigh the 
anticompetitive injuries can the plaintiff prevail.
100
 
D.  Vertical Restraint Case Law: 
A Pattern of Reflexive Condemnations? 
At the outset of antitrust enforcement, the Court could not 
identify any procompetitive justifications for imposing vertical 
restraints, and thus, in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co.,
101
 the Court deemed them to be illegal per se. However, this 
pronouncement has not endured. About fifty years after Dr. Miles, 
the Court began to reconsider its blanket condemnation of vertical 
restraints. In Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
102
 the 
Court declared that all vertical nonprice restraints would be subject 
to the rule of reason.
103
 Then in Leegin, the Court overturned nearly 
one hundred years of precedent when it changed the appropriate 
standard for evaluating minimum resale price fixing from the per se 
rule to rule of reason, thereby subjecting all vertical restraints to a 
 
 95. See id. 
 96. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 315–16 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 97. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1385. 
 98. Id. at 1385–86. 
 99. Id. at 1386. During this stage, the court may consider less restrictive alternatives to the 
restraint, but the existence of such alternatives does not automatically designate a restraint as 
anticompetitive, and, in the same way, the absence of such an alternative does not excuse the 
restraint as procompetitive. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271–72 (1963) 
(explaining that less restrictive alternatives are one of many considerations for determining 
competitive impact). 
 100. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1386. 
 101. 220 U.S. 373, 399–409 (1911). 
 102. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 103. Id. at 44–45, 59. 
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rule of reason analysis.
104
 The Court stated that “[i]t would make no 
sense to create out of the single term ‘restraint of trade’ a 
chronologically schizoid statute, in which a ‘rule of reason’ evolves 
with new circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of per se 
illegality remains forever fixed where it was.”
105
 The Court then 
declared that when Congress left the interpretation of the scope of 
the Sherman Act to the courts, it also granted the courts the power to 
decide if that scope must “evolve to meet the dynamics of present 
economic conditions.”
106
 Through the use of this power, the Supreme 
Court has created a “pattern of reflexive condemnations” in vertical 
enforcement,
107
 and it is clear that the Court still reserves the power 
to alter the standard whenever changing economic realities 
necessitate a change in the future. 
1.  Vertical Nonprice Restraints 
Initially, the Supreme Court refused to extend the per se 
standard to vertical nonprice restraints, as demonstrated in White 
Motor Co. v. United States.
108
 The Court recognized that this case 
was the first time that it was evaluating a vertical territorial 
restriction and, as such, stated that “[w]e need to know more than we 
do about the actual impact of these arrangements on competition to 
decide whether they . . . should be classified as per se violations of 
the Sherman Act.”
109
 The Court wanted to discern more information 
about the economic and business reasons for imposing the 
geographic restrictions and their actual impact on competition before 
condemning them as illegal per se.
110
 
Not long after that decision, the Court disregarded the hesitation 
it demonstrated in White, declaring all vertical nonprice restraints 
illegal per se in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.
111
 Instead of 
considering the economic effects of the territorial restraints that 
Schwinn imposed on its retailers, the Court relied on property law 
theories to justify the switch to the per se standard.
112
 The Court 
 
 104. See Leegin Creative Prods. Inc. v. PSKS Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007). 
 105. Id. at 900 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988)). 
 106. Id. at 899. 
 107. See Wright, supra note 16, at 2. 
 108. 372 U.S. 253, 255–57 (1963). 
 109. Id. at 263. 
 110. See id. 
 111. 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967). 
 112. Id. at 374–78. 
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stated that once a manufacturer “parts with dominion over his 
product or transfers risk of loss to another, he may not reverse 
control over its destiny or the conditions of its resale.”
113
 The Court 
then reasoned that a manufacturer attempting to control future sales 
of a product after the title passed to a purchaser would have no other 
motive but to eliminate competition.
114
 In the Court’s opinion, this 
was enough to validate a per se condemnation.
115
 
However, the Schwinn ruling was short lived. Just ten years 
later, the Court reconsidered the per se classification for all vertical 
nonprice restraints in Sylvania.
116
 In an effort to reinvigorate its 
dwindling market share, Sylvania had undertaken a new marketing 
strategy and, as part of its strategy, eliminated its distributors from 
the retail chain and instead sold directly to franchised retailers.
117
 
Sylvania then imposed limitations on the franchisors by limiting 
them to selling Sylvania products only from their specific franchised 
location while maintaining the ability to increase or decrease retailers 
as it deemed appropriate.
118
 The Court was concerned about applying 
a per se rule to the limitations in Sylvania’s franchise agreements 
because it wanted to know more about the actual impact of the 
arrangements on competition before proclaiming that they were 
unjustified and only had a “pernicious effect on competition.”
119
 
The Court pointed out that, although it is possible for vertical 
restrictions to reduce intrabrand competition, the restrictions 
generally prompt an increase of interbrand competition because 
manufacturers often use the restrictions to become more competitive 
with each other.
120
 It was this potential increase in interbrand 
competition that the Court accepted as a reasonable justification for 
restraining competition. In fact, the Court explained that due to 
market imperfections, specifically the “free rider”
121
 problem, 
 
 113. Id. at 379. 
 114. Id. at 379–81. 
 115. Id. at 382. 
 116. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 117. Id. at 38. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 50 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). 
 120. Id. at 54–55. 
 121. The free-rider problem arises when consumers utilize the services that a full-price 
retailer offers but ultimately purchase a good from a discount retailer who offers lower prices but 
no services. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1615. For a more complete discussion of 
free riding, see infra Part III.C.1. 
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restrictions may sometimes be necessary to preserve service quality 
and distribution efficiency.
122
 The Court clarified that a “departure 
from the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstrable 
economic effect rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing.”
123
 It 
then held that, due to the procompetitive justifications, the rule of 
reason was the appropriate test for all vertical nonprice restraints.
124
 
2.  Vertical Price Restraints 
In 1911, Dr. Miles first brought antitrust enforcement of vertical 
price fixing to the Court’s attention.
125
 In Dr. Miles, the Court 
deemed vertical price fixing illegal per se because it could find no 
difference between vertical and horizontal price fixing.
126
 Dr. Miles 
Medical Company was a drug manufacturer that sought to impose a 
minimum resale price on its distributors and all other subsequent 
purchasers in the chain of distribution.
127
 At issue was whether the 
manufacturer could impose such restrictions.
128
 In reaching its 
decision, the Court ignored the economic impact of the restrictions 
and instead relied on the property concept of restraints on 
alienation.
129
 The Court explained that once a purchaser has secured 
full ownership of a product, the purchaser shall be free from 
restrictions on any future uses.
130
 
The Court also found that the agreement among the 
manufacturer, the wholesalers, and the retailers to set retail prices 
was an obvious restraint on trade because it stifled competition.
131
 
The Court stated that the manufacturer had created “a system of 
interlocking restrictions” through which it attempted to control not 
only the prices set by its agents but also the prices set by all dealers 
in all industry-wide sales.
132
 The Court clarified that while 
reasonable restraints of trade are allowed, vertical price fixing was 
not reasonable because, like horizontal price fixing, there were no 
 
 122. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54–56. 
 123. Id. at 58–59. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911). 
 126. See id. at 407–08. 
 127. Id. at 394. 
 128. Id. at 395. 
 129. Id. at 404–05. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 400. 
 132. Id. at 399. 
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procompetitive benefits.
133
 The Court determined that the only 
possible motivation for invoking such restrictions was a desire to set 
prices and eliminate price competition.
134
 As a result, the Court 
classified vertical price fixing within the same category as horizontal 
price fixing agreements and declared it to be illegal per se.
135
 
More than eighty-five years after Dr. Miles, the Court began the 
shift to the rule of reason in State Oil Co. v. Khan
136
 when it 
reevaluated the suitability of the per se standard for analyzing 
maximum price fixing.
137
 Barkat Khan had entered into an agreement 
to lease and operate a gas station owned by State Oil and purchase its 
gasoline supply from State Oil.
138
 The agreement required that if 
Khan decided to sell gasoline at a price higher than State Oil’s 
suggested retail price, he would rebate the excess profits to State 
Oil.
139
 By imposing this restriction, State Oil had likely established a 
maximum resale price
140
—a per se violation of the Sherman Act 
according to Dr. Miles.
141
 However, instead of invoking stare decisis, 
the Court determined that maximum resale price fixing could be 
distinguished from minimum resale price fixing because the former 
does not encourage higher prices, and thus it does not harm 
competition and consumers.
142
 The Court then held that the rule of 
reason should apply to maximum resale price fixing.
143
 
Then, just ten years later, the Court completed the transition to 
the rule of reason in Leegin when it once again decided to “temper, 
limit, or overrule once strict prohibitions on vertical restraints.”
144
 
The Court took the last step in relaxing vertical enforcement by 
holding that the per se standard should no longer apply to minimum 
resale price maintenance.
145
 Leegin sold belts and other women’s 
fashion accessories under the name “Brighton” to over five thousand 
retailers, primarily independent boutiques and specialty stores, one of 
 
 133. Id. at 407. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 408. 
 136. 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 137. Id. at 7. 
 138. Id. at 7–8. 
 139. Id. at 8. 
 140. Id. at 9. 
 141. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911). 
 142. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 15. 
 143. Id. at 22. 
 144. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 901 (2007). 
 145. Id. at 907. 
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which was PSKS.
146
 Leegin had a policy of refusing to deal with any 
retailer who would not comply with its minimum suggested retail 
prices.
147
 When Leegin discovered that PSKS had been cutting prices 
by 20 percent across the entire line, it requested that PSKS comply 
with the suggested price, but PSKS refused.
148
 
On appeal before the Court, Leegin did not deny the existence of 
the agreement fixing minimum resale prices but instead argued that 
the rule of reason was the appropriate standard for determining 
whether its policy was in violation of the Sherman Act.
149
 In the 
years following Dr. Miles, the Court had continued to worry that 
vertical agreements produced the same anticompetitive effects as 
horizontal agreements and, as such, had declined to switch to the rule 
of reason.
150
 However, in Leegin, the Court recognized that the more 
recent case law no longer treated vertical and horizontal conduct as 
analogous and found the property concepts applied in Dr. Miles were 
outdated.
151
 As a result, the Court reconsidered the economic impacts 
of the two classes of restraints.
152
 In the end, the Court agreed with 
Leegin that vertical price fixing, unlike horizontal price fixing, could 
have procompetitive justifications, including an increase of 
interbrand competition, a decrease in the prevalence of free riders, 
and an increased facilitation for new market entrants.
153
 
In reaching its decision, the Court noted that, although higher 
prices were a potential consequence, they were not sufficient to hold 
minimum resale price fixing to a per se standard without an 
additional showing of anticompetitive conduct.
154
 Instead, the Court 
stressed that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote 
interbrand competition, not to protect consumers from high prices.
155
 
Despite this proclamation, the Court assured the parties that the “rule 
of reason [was] designed and used to eliminate anticompetitive 
transactions from the market.”
156
 It also warned the lower courts to 
 
 146. Id. at 882. 
 147. Id. at 883. 
 148. Id. at 884. 
 149. Id. at 884–85. 
 150. Id. at 887–89. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 889. 
 153. Id. at 890–92. 
 154. Id. at 895. 
 155. Id. at 895–96. 
 156. Id. at 898. 
  
Summer 2012] AN ANTITRUST NARCOTIC 1247 
be diligent in eliminating the anticompetitive uses of vertical price 
restraints from the market, particularly when policing entities with 
dominant market power that could be disguising a cartel with vertical 
price fixing.
157
 
III.  DOWN FOR THE COUNT: 
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS ARE LEGAL PER SE 
UNDER THE RULE OF REASON 
In spite of its admission in Leegin that anticompetitive impacts 
could outweigh the procompetitive effects of vertical restraints, the 
Court tasked the lower courts with devising their own rules and 
fabricating their own litigation structures to guarantee that the rule of 
reason would eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market.
158
 
Consequently, after Leegin, there was a great deal of uncertainty as 
to how the lower courts would interpret the Court’s strategy for an 
effective rule of reason analysis.
159
 Since Sylvania and Leegin, 
federal courts
160
 have employed the rule of reason in vertical price 
and nonprice restraint cases, and while courts seem to be heeding the 
advice of the Supreme Court—to develop their own methods for 
performing a rule of reason analysis—plaintiffs seeking vertical 
enforcement have experienced very limited success.
161
 This should 
not come as a surprise to many, as one of the primary criticisms of 
the rule of reason is that enforcement levels become suboptimal 
because plaintiffs have difficulty overcoming the high burden of 
proof.
162
 Under the rule of reason, plaintiffs must first satisfy their 
initial burden of proof by sufficiently alleging the existence of an 
 
 157. Id. at 897–98. 
 158. Id. at 898–99. 
 159. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 249–50. 
 160. The scope of this Article is limited to federal courts, but it is worth noting that although 
many states chose to harmonize their antitrust laws with federal antitrust laws, Leegin is not 
binding precedent on the states. Michael A. Lindsay, State Resale Price Maintenance Laws After 
Leegin, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2009, at 1, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Oct09_Lindsay10_23f.authcheckdam.pdf. After Leegin, it 
was unclear how the states would deal with vertical restraint enforcement. Id. Some state courts 
rejected the per se standard and at least one state had even taken measures to proclaim its outright 
rejection of Leegin. Id. at 2. Less than two years after Leegin, Maryland passed legislation 
declaring that minimum resale price fixing was unlawful per se. Id. at 2. For a more detailed 
discussion of state antitrust enforcement after Leegin, see id. at 1–7, and Lindsay, Overview of 
State RPM, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2010, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/source_lindsay_chart.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 161. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 257–65. 
 162. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1620. 
  
1248 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1225 
agreement that unreasonably restrains competition and must then 
prove that the restraint’s anticompetitive harms outweigh any 
procompetitive justifications.
163
 Satisfying the second burden has 
become particularly challenging in light of courts’ willingness to 
accept the facile procompetitive justifications that a restraint 
promotes interbrand competition or counteracts the free-rider 
problem.
164
 The suboptimal enforcement existing under the rule of 
reason leads many skeptics to declare that, in application, the rule of 
reason operates as a de facto rule of legality.
165
 
In Sylvania and Leegin, the Supreme Court endorsed a rule of 
reason approach and never expressly sanctioned a per se legality 
standard.
166
 However, notwithstanding the Court’s intention, there is 
substantial data and literature supporting the idea that the rule of 
reason defaults to a rule of per se legality.
167
 For example, then-
Judge Ginsburg of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit conducted a survey of the outcome of all vertical 
nonprice restraint cases following the Court’s decision in Sylvania.
168
 
She found that from 1977 until 1991, federal district courts 
considered forty-five cases alleging an antitrust violation, and, of 
those, plaintiffs lost forty-one.
169
 This exposes that, following the 
Court’s decision to subject nonprice restraints to the rule of reason, 
less than 10 percent of plaintiffs won cases alleging an antitrust 
violation.
170
 Moreover, there also is evidence that maximum vertical 
price fixing has suffered a similar fate by becoming “de facto legal” 
since the Court’s decision to subject the practice to the rule of reason 
in Khan.
171
 Perhaps most revealing, one study demonstrates that in 
the decade from 1999 and 2009, plaintiffs lost 221 out of all 222 
 
 163. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1385. 
 164. See William Kolasky, Review of How the Chicago School Overshot the Mark, 5 
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 173, 177 (2009) (noting that scholars recently identified this trend). 
 165. See, e.g., Marina Lao, Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free 
Rider Issues, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 473, 507 (2010) (referencing criticisms by Judge Richard 
Posner and Judge Douglas Ginsburg); Kelly, supra note 4, at 635–40. 
 166. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Lao, supra note 165, at 507. 
 167. See Lao, supra note 165, at 507–10. 
 168. Id. at 508. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. (citing Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1911, 1912 (2009)). 
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cases subject to the rule of reason that reached final judgment.
172
 
That is, plaintiffs lost more than 99 percent of cases under the rule of 
reason in a ten-year period.
173
 
The extreme scarcity of successful claims under the rule of 
reason raises a red flag, and while these studies alone are not 
determinative, they certainly suggest that the rule of reason standard 
has resulted in per se legality.
174
 The mounting concern for plaintiffs 
who are unable to win under the rule of reason is further evidenced 
by reflexive actions taken by Congress and state governments 
following the Leegin decision, including a Senate bill proposal that 
would overturn Leegin
175
 and many state laws proclaiming that 
vertical price fixing remained illegal per se.
176
 The Senate bill, 
proposed less than four months after Leegin, disparaged Leegin 
outright and explicitly disclosed that the bill’s purpose was to 
overturn the Court’s decision and return vertical minimum price 
fixing to a per se standard.
177
 The bill, since renamed the Discount 
Pricing Consumer Protection Act, has been a highly controversial 
topic in Congressional hearings and has not yet been passed.
178
 
Contributing further to this unrest is the contention that the Court has 
exceeded its congressional grant of authority by forgoing the original 
intention of the Sherman Act and choosing, instead, to favor its own 
ideologies.
179
 The argument is not that policy concessions should 
 
 172. Id. (citing Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st 
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 829 (2009)). It is fair to point out that at least some cases 
settle before final judgment; therefore, plaintiffs may have a higher likelihood of prevailing under 
the rule of reason than these studies reveal. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1424. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 643. 
 176. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 177. Kelly, supra note 4, at 643. 
 178. Ariana E. Gillies, Note, Not with a Bang, But a Whimper: Congress’s Proposal to 
Overturn the Supreme Court’s Leegin Decision with the Discount Pricing Consumer Protection 
Act of 2009, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 645, 646 (2011). A version of the bill died in 
committee in 2009; in 2011, Senator Herbert Kohl and Representative Henry Johnson sponsored 
new versions of the bill, neither of which has been passed into law. Discount Pricing Consumer 
Protection Act of 2009, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3190 (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2012); Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act of 2011, GOVTRACK, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3406 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); Discount Pricing 
Consumer Protection Act, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s75 (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 179. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1480–81. 
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never be made, but that the legislature—not the courts—should be 
responsible for making that assessment.
180
 
Although the Supreme Court might have intended the rule of 
reason to be a flexible replacement for the per se rule, it erred by 
continuing to ignore the infirmities associated with conducting a rule 
of reason analysis. The Court failed to articulate a clear standard of 
analysis in Sylvania and then neglected to do so again in Leegin. This 
lack of guidance is particularly unsettling because the Court said that 
the lower courts’ ineffectiveness in conducting an accurate economic 
analysis was a primary factor contributing to its decision in Leegin to 
switch to the rule of reason.
181
 Yet, despite the Court’s 
acknowledgement that the lower courts were not familiar enough 
with the competitive effects of vertical restraints to validate a per se 
rule, the Court somehow had confidence that the lower courts were 
familiar enough to develop their own standards for conducting a rule 
of reason analysis.
182
 
As one commentator pointed out, “[t]he Court’s shift from per 
se rules would be an unsurprising reflection of the Court’s increased 
confidence in its or the lower courts’ capacity to adjudicate complex 
economic issues . . . .”
183
 However, this is not the case with antitrust 
analysis—the Court has actually become more skeptical of the 
judiciary’s competence to issue consistent and accurate rulings in 
recent years.
184
 
Lower courts’ inability to evaluate the impact of economic 
changes, which include difficulty allocating the proper weight to 
policy considerations, may be the biggest concern for plaintiffs, but 
additional obstacles have contributed to plaintiffs’ limited success in 
recent vertical-restraint cases. Such difficulties include an increased 
burden at the pleading stage in the wake of Leegin and Twombly,
185
 
and the issue of how the lower courts identify the horizontal effects 
of vertical agreements—except in cases exhibiting clear proof of 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Liebeskind & Tiffany, supra note 92, at 2. 
 182. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898–99 (2007). 
 183. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1408. 
 184. Id. at 1408–09 (citing Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281–82 
(2007); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414–15 (2004)). 
 185. See Liebeskind & Tiffany, supra note 92, at 2 (“Leegin’s reasonableness requirement 
makes the already heightened Twombly standard even more rigorous . . . .”). 
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horizontal collusion.
186
 When viewed in the aggregate, these issues 
bolster the concerns that the lower courts are applying a rule of 
reason analysis that fails to protect the market from anticompetitive 
conduct, and thereby results in a de facto declaration of per se 
legality for vertical restraints. 
A.  Leegin and Twombly: 
Sounding the Death Knell 
for Vertical Restraint Liability 
When a pleading standard is too high, it becomes nearly 
impossible for a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.
187
 In vertical-restraint cases, this heightened pleading 
standard essentially operates as a presumption of legality. Twombly 
increased the burden on plaintiffs in the pleading stages of antitrust 
cases by requiring them to disclose enough factual information to 
demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was plausible and not just 
possible.
188
 On its own, Twombly does not seem to create an 
impenetrable standard for pleading, but when combined with Leegin, 
it might. 
1.  Plausible Pleadings as 
Required by Twombly 
In Twombly, consumers brought a putative class action against 
numerous major telecommunications providers, alleging that the 
providers violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
189
 In their 
complaint, the consumers did not provide proof of a tacit unlawful 
agreement between the providers but instead pointed to the 
providers’ parallel conduct to prove an agreement existed.
190
 The 
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs had 
not “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.”
191
 The Court explained that to survive a motion to 
dismiss, plaintiffs must plead not just a “short and plain statement of 
 
 186. See infra Part III.B. 
 187. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 67–68 (2010) (discussing a high dismissal rate after 
Twombly). 
 188. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 
 189. Id. at 550. 
 190. Id. at 564. 
 191. Id. at 570. 
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the claim” but enough factual allegations “to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level.”
192
 
In reaching its decision, the Court warned plaintiffs of the 
danger of pleading only ambiguous parallel or interdependent 
conduct, stating that such conduct could just as easily be consistent 
with a conspiracy as it could with a “wide swath of rational and 
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common 
perceptions of the market.”
193
 In an effort to prevent superfluous 
litigation, the Court required plaintiffs to provide in the pleadings a 
stronger showing of a violation.
194
 While the plaintiffs in Twombly 
alleged a horizontal conspiracy among competitors, and not a vertical 
agreement, Twombly set the bar for the level of particularity required 
of pleadings in all antitrust cases.
195
 Typically, there is no need to 
circumstantially prove the existence of concerted action in vertical-
restraint cases because an agreement is usually clear; however, 
Twombly affects vertical-restraint cases by requiring plaintiffs to 
provide enough factual assertions of anticompetitive conduct in their 
complaints to allege an unreasonable restraint on trade that would 
entitle them to relief.
196
 
2.  An Insurmountable Standard? 
A Plaintiff’s Plight in the 
Wake of Leegin and Twombly 
By requiring more than mere allegations of anticompetitive 
conduct, Twombly forced plaintiffs to think twice before filing a 
complaint.
197
 Leegin then added an additional burden for plaintiffs to 
garner antitrust enforcement in vertical-restraint cases.
198
 After 
Leegin, plaintiffs had to successfully plead not only the existence of 
an agreement restraining competition but also the unreasonableness 
of the restraint.
199
 Many courts have since gone as far as requiring 
plaintiffs to show that the restraint does not merely have the potential 
 
 192. Id. at 555. 
 193. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 497; see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554. 
 194. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59. 
 195. See id. at 555–56. 
 196. See id. 
 197. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 499. 
 198. Dresnick & Tucker Ronzetti, supra note 26, at 250. 
 199. See Liebeskind & Tiffany, supra note 92, at 2 (stating that in resale-price-maintenance 
cases, plaintiffs must allege facts that plausibly suggest that an agreement exists and that is 
unreasonable). 
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to harm competition but that it does in fact harm competition.
200
 This 
additional element requires plaintiffs to sufficiently establish the 
relevant market and the anticompetitive impact of a restraint.
201
 The 
lower courts have consistently emphasized that plaintiffs must satisfy 
this increased burden at the pleading stage.
202
 
Prior to Leegin, plaintiffs often would describe only general 
allegations of anticompetitive conduct in their pleadings because 
defendants typically concealed such conduct, making it difficult to 
prove the allegations prior to discovery.
203
 As a result, plaintiffs 
relied heavily on discovery to produce proof of antitrust violations.
204
 
However, this is no longer a viable strategy in the wake of Leegin 
and Twombly.
205
 
Leegin’s subsequent case history is particularly interesting.
206
 
After the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, the district court 
granted Leegin’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and PSKS subsequently 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
207
 Citing Twombly, the Fifth Circuit 
stated that in order to survive the pleading stages, the plaintiffs must 
describe “sufficient factual matter” and not mere “labels and 
conclusions.”
208
 The Fifth Circuit also explained that, in antitrust 
cases, this rule requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the defendant’s 
conduct actually harmed competition.
209
 The court then clarified that, 
according to Leegin, higher prices alone do not sufficiently identify 
an unreasonable restraint on competition.
210
 Instead, the court 
pointed out that when pleading resale-price-maintenance claims, 
plaintiffs must “plausibly define the relevant product and geographic 
 
 200. See, e.g., Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012); PSKS, Inc. v. 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010); Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, 
Inc., 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010); Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-
187, 2008 WL 3914461 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008). According to lower courts, potential to harm 
competition is not sufficient unless a defendant also possesses market power, and some courts 
have even stated that actual harm to consumers, such as higher prices, is insufficient to overcome 
the procompetitive benefits as well. See Jacobs, 626 F.3d at 1339–40. 
 201. Liebeskind & Tiffany, supra note 92, at 2. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412 (2010). 
 207. Id. at 414. 
 208. Id. at 417 (internal quotations omitted). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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markets”
211
 and then “plausibly allege the defendant’s market power 
[in those markets].”
212
 After laying out the standards for defining a 
relevant market, the Fifth Circuit determined that PSKS failed to 
adequately define the relevant product market.
213
 As a result, the 
court held that PSKS’s claim could not survive the motion to dismiss 
because the complaint failed to sufficiently plead that Leegin 
possessed market power and did not allege any other injury to 
competition.
214
 
Similarly, in a different case against Leegin, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee had to evaluate 
whether a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was appropriate in light of 
Leegin and Twombly.
215
 The facts of the case and the vertical price-
fixing agreement were the same as those laid out in Leegin, except 
the plaintiff, Spahr, was a different retailer.
216
 The court dismissed 
Spahr’s definition of the relevant product market because reasonable 
substitute products for the Brighton brand were available.
217
 The 
court also found that Spahr’s evidence that the agreement led to 
higher prices was inadequate to demonstrate sufficient 
anticompetitive harm.
218
 Ultimately, the court decided that Spahr had 
not appropriately pleaded a cause of action against Leegin.
219
 
This trend has gained traction in other jurisdictions as well.
220
 In 
Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic International, Inc.,
221
 the Eleventh Circuit 
applied a two-step analysis when evaluating whether the plaintiff’s 
pleadings were sufficient.
222
 In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged 
the existence of an anticompetitive price-fixing agreement between a 
mattress manufacturer and its distributor.
223
 According to the court, 
the first step of the analysis calls for a determination of “whether the 
 
 211. Id. at 417. 
 212. Id. at 419. 
 213. Id. at 419–20. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-187, 2008 WL 3914461, 
at *1 (E.D. Tenn Aug. 20, 2008). 
 216. Id. at *2–3. 
 217. Id. at *11. 
 218. Id. at *11–12. 
 219. Id. at *16. 
 220. See, e.g., Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012); Jacobs v. 
Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 221. 626 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 222. Id. at 1333 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). 
 223. Id. at 1331–33. 
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complaint’s averments are more than bare legal conclusions,” and the 
second step involves “examin[ing] the complaint for a sufficient 
quantum of allegations to plausibly suggest” that a vertical 
agreement to restrain trade existed and violated the Sherman Act.
224
 
The court found that the pleadings satisfied the first step of the 
process but did not adequately identify the relevant market and, 
therefore, could not satisfy the second step.
225
 Jacobs defined the 
relevant market as “visco-elastic foam mattresses” in the complaint 
but did not provide any factual economic data about the consumer 
demand for these mattresses.
226
 The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged 
that a subset of a larger market can be identified as the relevant 
market, but only when there is a separate consumer demand for the 
product, and this demand must be pleaded in accordance with 
Twombly.
227
 The court then noted that even if Jacobs had properly 
defined the relevant market, the complaint still would not have 
satisfied Twombly because it failed to provide more than “bald 
statement[s]” alleging anticompetitive harm and market power.
228
 
Then in 2011, the Ninth Circuit jumped on board with this trend 
in Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., when it held that merely pleading 
general harm to consumers, namely higher prices, was insufficient to 
survive a motion to dismiss.
229
 Instead, the Ninth Circuit required the 
plaintiffs to point to a specific injury to competition.
230
 In Brantley, a 
class of plaintiffs asked the Ninth Circuit to reverse the district 
court’s 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a valid claim.
231
 The 
plaintiffs, a class of television subscribers, alleged that television 
programmers and distributors had violated Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act by bundling channels and effectively compelling consumers into 
purchasing multi-channel packages.
232
 The Ninth Circuit stated that 
plaintiffs “may not substitute allegations of injury to the claimants 
 
 224. Id. at 1333. 
 225. Id. at 1333, 1336. 
 226. Id. at 1338. 
 227. Id. at 1337–38. 
 228. Id. at 1339–40. 
 229. 675 F.3d 1192, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit first decided Brantley in 
June 2011 but later withdrew the opinion and issued the superseding opinion cited in this Article. 
Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 649 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2011) opinion withdrawn, 661 
F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2011) and superseded, 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 1195–96. 
 232. Id. 
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for allegations of injury to competition.”
233
 The court then found that 
the television subscribers had not claimed a sufficient injury to 
competition by merely pointing out that the bundles hurt consumers 
through reducing choice and increasing prices.
234
 Although the court 
acknowledged that an industry-wide practice is more likely to be 
anticompetitive and should therefore be scrutinized more carefully, it 
refused to delve any deeper because the subscribers had not 
adequately explained in their pleadings how this widespread practice 
harmed competition.
235
 
However, a few cases have proven that sufficiently pleading a 
vertical-restraint violation is possible.
236
 For instance, in 
Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc.,
237
 the plaintiffs survived a 
motion to dismiss after alleging an anticompetitive price-fixing 
agreement.
238
 There, Toys ‘R’ Us entered into agreements with 
product manufacturers to ensure that the manufacturers would 
impose minimum resale-price restraints on their retailers in order to 
prevent smaller retailers from undercutting Toys ‘R’ Us’s prices.
239
 
In denying the motion to dismiss, the court stated that plaintiffs had 
pleaded their claim—by defining the relevant market, identifying 
concerted action, proving the anticompetitive nature of the action, 
and establishing a causal nexus—with enough “heft” to satisfy 
Twombly.
240
 However, following the court’s denial of the motion to 
dismiss, the parties settled the case, and the court never determined 
Toys ‘R’ Us’s liability under the rule of reason.
241
 
 
 233. Id. at 1200. 
 234. Id. at 1201–02. 
 235. Id. at 1203–03. 
 236. E.g., Babyage.com, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 2d 575 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 580–84. 
 239. Id. at 579. 
 240. Id. at 579–84. 
 241. Amaris Elliott-Engel, $35 Million Settlement Approved in Baby Products Antitrust Class 
Action, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 16, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/ 
pg/12016/1203332-499.stm. This demonstrates a common trend that, even when plaintiffs have 
stated an antitrust injury sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, they often settle to avoid the 
expense of continued litigation and uncertainty under the rule of reason. Heather M. Cooper, 
What a ‘Babies “R” Us’ Class Action Lawsuit Can Teach Us About Successful Distribution 
Strategies for the Current Legal and Economic Climate, ANTITRUST L. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2009), 
http://www.antitrustlawblog.com/2009/09/articles/what-a-babies-r-us-class-action-lawsuit-can-
teach-us-about-successful-distribution-strategies-for-the-current-legal-and-economic-climate/. 
The concern with this trend is that plaintiffs are not being adequately compensated for the damage 
that vertical restraints inflict. Id. 
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In sum, the subsequent history of Leegin and the Spahr, Jacobs, 
and Brantley line of cases demonstrate the difficulty that plaintiffs 
currently encounter at the pleading stage in the wake of Twombly and 
Leegin. In most of these cases, the plaintiffs were not able to 
overcome the initial burden of proof, and, unfortunately, this is 
becoming the norm for plaintiffs attempting to allege an antitrust 
violation under the rule of reason. Babyage proves that, while 
difficult, plaintiffs can successfully plead an unreasonable restriction 
on competition under the rule of reason. However, even when 
plaintiffs survive a motion to dismiss, they often enter into settlement 
agreements, as seen in Babyage, because both parties recognize the 
costs and risks associated with undertaking a full rule of reason 
analysis at trial.
242
 In either case, empirical evidence seems to 
suggest that, under the rule of reason, nearly all plaintiffs lose on 
motions to dismiss because they have not sufficiently pleaded an 
antitrust injury.
243
 Given this, it is arguable that a heightened 
pleading standard has contributed to the per se legality of vertical 
restraints.
244
 
B.  Pleading Vertical Agreement 
and Horizontal Collusion: 
Not a Plaintiff’s Saving Grace 
The Supreme Court’s earliest decisions concerning vertical price 
fixing reflected the belief that such restraints enabled manufacturers 
and retailers to conspire with each other or, in other words, to engage 
in horizontal price fixing.
245
 One of the most prominent criticisms of 
evaluating vertical restraints under the rule of reason is that vertical 
restraints, specifically price restraints, increase horizontal collusion 
among competitors and can lead to more stabilized cartels among 
dealers and manufacturers.
246
 A few antitrust scholars even contend 
that the distinction between horizontal and vertical conduct is 
nonsensical.
247
 They argue that the relevant inquiry should not be 
whether one entity “imposed” a restriction on another entity but 
 
 242. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1424. 
 243. Id. at 1423. 
 244. See Liebeskind & Tiffany, supra note 92, at 2. 
 245. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1602; see, e.g., Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 246. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 607. 
 247. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1238–39. 
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rather whether the restriction operates in an anticompetitive 
manner.
248
 
Parties often implement horizontal and vertical restraints, 
specifically price fixing, with the same goals in mind—to increase 
profits and reduce competition.
249
 Therefore the existence of one 
type of restraint can promulgate the existence of the other.
250
 
Horizontal price fixing results from vertical price fixing because 
manufacturers lose their incentive to undercut each other’s prices as 
vertical price fixing stabilizes prices across the market.
251
 If an 
industry-wide standard for resale pricing exists, manufacturers will 
prefer to maintain the status quo in order to continue taking 
advantage of higher profit margins.
252
 Engaging in price competition 
by lowering prices no longer drives up a manufacturer’s sales 
volume; instead, it only causes that manufacturer’s profits to 
suffer.
253
 This is because when price maintenance agreements 
regulate what price retailers may charge, retailers can no longer pass 
any reduction in a manufacturer’s wholesale price along to 
consumers.
254
 Therefore, in markets rife with resale price 
maintenance, the only beneficiaries of undercutting are retailers, and 
competition at the manufacturer level suffers as a result.
255
 The 
capacity for vertical restraints to disguise horizontal collusion creates 
a conspicuous hazard that per se illegal conduct is going undetected. 
1.  Horizontal vs. Vertical: 
The Significance of Categorization 
Before the Court overruled Dr. Miles and Schwinn, the 
horizontal ramifications of vertical restrictions were immaterial to 
the standard of analysis because both horizontal and vertical 
restraints were considered illegal per se. However, once the Court 
changed the standard for vertical restraints to the rule of reason, 
discerning what type of conduct was at issue became essential to 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. Taralson, supra note 51, at 581–82. 
 250. Id. 
 251. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1605. 
 252. Kelly, supra note 4, at 627. 
 253. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1605. 
 254. Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se 
Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490–91 (1983). 
 255. See id. 
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determining legality.
256
 This can be directly attributed to the weight 
that characterizing a restraint as horizontal or vertical has on the 
outcome of a case—plaintiffs win under the per se rule and almost 
always lose under the rule of reason.
257
 Accordingly, plaintiffs 
attempt to trigger a per se standard by fitting the restraint into a 
“forbidden box,” and meanwhile defendants work to keep it out of 
such a box and subject to a more lenient rule of reason analysis.
258
 
Inevitably, categorization has become the primary concern of 
litigants, thereby making it imperative for courts to ensure that 
vertical restraints are not used as a pretense to conceal an innately 
unlawful horizontal conspiracy.
259
 
However, determining when vertical agreements buttress 
horizontal collusion is no easy feat.
260
 In Sylvania, the Court 
recognized that, at times, courts may struggle to distinguish between 
horizontal and vertical restraints.
261
 The pleading requirements set 
forth in Twombly require that plaintiffs clearly allege the existence of 
a horizontal agreement before a court can consider applying the per 
se rule.
262
 Therefore, alleging horizontal conspiracy is especially 
difficult in cases where there is merely concerted action but no 
explicit agreement.
263
 In particular, vertical price maintenance is 
extremely challenging to prove due to the ease with which 
competitors are able to enter into an unspoken agreement by just 
monitoring each other’s prices.
264
 
Therefore, because characterizing a restraint as horizontal or 
vertical proves to be outcome determinative, plaintiffs have more 
incentive to classify restraints as horizontal whenever possible to 
take advantage of the per se analysis.
265
And although plaintiffs have 
typically had very little success overcoming motions to dismiss after 
Twombly, they have been triumphant when they prove that a 
 
 256. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1232–33. 
 257. See id. 
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 259. See id. 
 260. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 627. 
 261. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28 (1977). 
 262. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548–49, 556–57 (2007); id. at 571–72 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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 265. See Comment, Vertical Agreement as a Horizontal Restraint: Centuro, Inc. v. United 
Cabinet Corp., 128 U. PA. L. REV. 622, 644–45 n.138 (1980). 
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horizontal conspiracy was disguised by vertical conduct.
266
 For 
example, plaintiffs win when they can prove that vertical price fixing 
was the result of a horizontal agreement to fix prices.
267
 
2.  Pleading Horizontal Collusion Pays Off 
Not long after Leegin, the Fifth Circuit clarified in Tunica Web 
Advertising v. Tunica Casino Operators Ass’n. that a vertical refusal 
to deal would be per se illegal if it resulted from a horizontal 
agreement among competitors.
268
 In Tunica, an Internet-advertising 
agency held the rights to the domain address tunica.com.
269
 The 
agency proposed to all of the casinos in Tunica County, Mississippi, 
that they could lease the rights to the address for $2,500 per month, 
meaning that when web browsers clicked on tunica.com, they would 
be redirected to the Tunica County Tourism Commission’s website, 
which featured information about each of the casinos.
270
 The casinos 
declined unanimously.
271
 The Fifth Circuit explained that the 
industry-wide refusal to agree to the proposal was not a sufficient 
violation.
272
 However, when the casinos subsequently entered into a 
“gentleman’s agreement” refusing to deal with the agency for the 
purpose of rendering tunica.com worthless, the court found that the 
casinos had crossed from vertical conduct into a horizontal 
agreement to boycott.
273
 The court then remanded the case with 
instructions that the district court reconsider whether the rule of 
reason was the appropriate standard for evaluating this type of 
horizontal group boycott.
274
 In doing so, the court stressed that 
Leegin required the per se rule only when “courts can predict with 
confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances 
under the rule of reason.”
275
 
 
 266. Peter Sullivan & Craig Linder, Vertical Restraints, in 48TH ANNUAL ADVANCED 
ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION & MARKETING VOLUME ONE 45, 69–70 (2009). 
 267. Id. 
 268. 496 F.3d 403, 406–08, 411–15 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 269. Id. at 406. 
 270. Id. at 407. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. at 410. 
 273. See id. at 410–11, 414. 
 274. Id. at 414–15. 
 275. Id. at 414 (quoting Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886–87 
(2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Leegin, a district court 
in the Eastern District of Wisconsin applied the per se rule to a 
statute that encouraged both vertical and horizontal agreement in 
Lotus Business Group, LLC v. Flying J Inc.
276
 In Flying J, a gasoline 
retailer alleged that a competitor had violated a Wisconsin statute 
requiring gasoline retailers to increase their resale price by at least 
9.18 percent.
277
 The competitor asserted as an affirmative defense 
that the enforcement of the statute violated the Supremacy Clause by 
establishing price fixing in contravention of the Sherman Act.
278
 The 
court agreed that the statute constituted an antitrust violation and 
subjected it to per se analysis.
279
 Following Leegin, the district court 
reconsidered the statute under the rule of reason, but it upheld its 
application of the per se rule, finding that the statute created 
horizontal price fixing by setting an industry-wide standard.
280
 The 
court declared that it would still evaluate horizontal cartels as per se 
violations even when vertical price fixing was also involved.
281
 
Furthermore, the court said that the statute would be unlawful 
regardless of whether it was evaluated under the per se standard or 
the rule of reason because it constituted a vertical price-fixing 
agreement intended to facilitate a horizontal cartel.
282
 The court also 
contrasted this situation with one in which only a few manufacturers, 
without market power, implement the practice, concluding that 
vertical price fixing deserves more careful scrutiny when many 
competing manufacturers adopt the practice or when there is a strong 
showing of market power.
283
 
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit confirmed in TFWS, Inc. v. 
Franchot that horizontal price fixing would remain distinguishable 
from vertical price fixing and would continue to be illegal per se.
284
 
Following Leegin, the state of Maryland asked the Fourth Circuit to 
reevaluate whether it was appropriate to apply the per se rule to its 
liquor and wine price-setting regulations.
285
 Maryland claimed that in 
 
 276. 532 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1029 (E.D. Wis. 2007). 
 277. Id. at 1012. 
 278. Id. at 1012–13. 
 279. Id. at 1012, 1017–18. 
 280. Id. at 1028–29. 
 281. Id. at 1028. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 1027. 
 284. 572 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 285. Id. at 188. 
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Leegin the Supreme Court declared that all resale price maintenance 
would be subject to rule of reason analysis.
286
 The Fourth Circuit 
refused to accept this argument because the Court considered only 
vertical restraints in Leegin and not horizontal price fixing like that 
being implemented by Maryland.
287
 In reaffirming its earlier decision 
to apply the per se rule, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Leegin as 
confirming the importance of using the per se standard when 
evaluating horizontal agreements restricting competition.
288
 
These cases indicate the willingness of courts to apply the per se 
rule when plaintiffs successfully establish that there is a horizontal 
agreement in effect. Thus, at least some courts seem capable of 
distinguishing between horizontal collusion and agreements among 
entities within the chain of distribution. However, not all courts are 
on the same page, and plaintiffs continue to struggle to meet the 
burden of proving horizontal conspiracy in cases where there is 
evidence of both horizontal and vertical agreements. 
3.  Not an Absolute: 
Courts Are Reluctant to 
Classify Restraints as Horizontal 
Despite the success plaintiffs have had when they are able to 
establish that defendants’ vertical restraints are actually horizontal in 
nature, the courts are reluctant to make such characterizations by 
merely implying that vertical restraints have horizontal 
repercussions.
289
 In Leegin, the Supreme Court reminded the lower 
courts that horizontal behavior must be distinguished from vertical 
behavior and must continue to be evaluated under the per se 
standard.
290
 This warning seems to be carrying some weight in the 
lower courts.
291
 Lower courts have ensured that when there is 
evidence of a horizontal agreement among competitors to fix prices 
or eliminate competition, a per se standard is still appropriate.
292
 
However, some courts have refused to extend the per se exception to 
 
 286. See id. at 191. 
 287. Id. at 191–92. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Sullivan & Linder, supra note 266, at 71. 
 290. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 893 (2007). 
 291. See, e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 
2008); Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-187, 2008 WL 3914461 (E.D. 
Tenn. Aug. 20, 2008). 
 292. See Mack, 530 F.3d at 225; Spahr, 2008 WL 3914461, at *4–6. 
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vertical restraints unless an explicit horizontal agreement exists.
293
 
This poses a problem for plaintiffs because oftentimes horizontal 
agreements are unspoken.
294
 Additionally, courts sometimes choose 
to ignore certain horizontal relationships.
295
 For instance, a 
horizontal aspect emerges in the relationship between a manufacturer 
and its retailers when the manufacturer chooses to sell its products 
directly to consumers and through independent retailers, but courts 
often find that this relationship does not warrant a per se approach.
296
 
Moreover, at least one court has refused to use the per se rule even 
when a manufacturer imposes vertical restraint for the sole purpose 
of strengthening illegal horizontal cartels.
297
 
In deciding to dismiss Spahr v. Leegin Creative Leather 
Products, Inc., the Eastern District of Tennessee rejected Spahr’s 
assertion that the per se rule should apply because Leegin, as a 
distributor of its own products, had engaged in horizontal price 
fixing.
298
 Spahr’s argument was that because Leegin was a retailer of 
its own products, it should be viewed as a horizontal competitor to its 
independent retailers and thereby as a participant in a horizontal 
conspiracy to fix prices.
299
 Citing the Sixth Circuit case International 
Logistics Group, Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp.,
300
 the court stated that 
businesses operating under a dual-distribution system
301
 do not open 
themselves up to horizontal liability when imposing restraints on 
independent distributors.
302
 The court found that no horizontal 
scheme existed because antitrust laws do not prohibit businesses 
from selling their own products while simultaneously utilizing 
independent retailers, and Spahr had demonstrated no other evidence 
 
 293. Mack, 530 F.3d at 220–21; Spahr, 2008 WL 3914461, at *3–4. 
 294. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 627. 
 295. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1235–36. 
 296. Id. at 1236. 
 297. Spahr, 2008 WL 3914461, at *4. 
 298. Id. at *4, *15. 
 299. Id. at *5. 
 300. 884 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.1989). 
 301. In other words, a manufacture simultaneously distributes its own products to consumers 
directly and through other independent distributors. Spahr, 2008 WL 3914461, at *6 (stating that 
a dual distributor is a manufacturer who “operates a branch of dealership on the same market 
level as one or more of its customers” (citation omitted)). 
 302. Id. 
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of horizontal collusion.
303
 Consequently, the court applied the rule of 
reason.
304
 
Likewise, the Third Circuit found the rule of reason was the 
appropriate standard in Toledo Mack Sales & Services, Inc. v. Mack 
Trucks, Inc.,
305
 despite recognizing the likelihood that a truck 
manufacturer’s sole purpose for entering into agreements with its 
dealers was to support an agreement among the dealers not to 
compete.
306
 One of Mack’s dealers refused to comply with the terms 
of the agreement that limited the dealer to distributing trucks inside 
an assigned geographic territory.
307
 The dealer alleged that the only 
reason Mack implemented the territorial restrictions was to support 
an agreement between its dealers to fix prices by agreeing not to 
compete with one another.
308
 The Third Circuit explained that it 
would evaluate the agreement among the dealers according to the per 
se rule because the agreement involved collusion among horizontal 
competitors to set prices,
309
 but it also explained that the agreements 
between Mack and its dealers would be subject to the rule of 
reason.
310
 The Third Circuit, citing Leegin, stated that “the rule of 
reason analysis applies [to vertical agreements] even when . . . the 
plaintiff alleges that the purpose of the vertical agreement between a 
manufacturer and its dealers is to support illegal horizontal 
agreements between multiple dealers.”
311
 
As shown in the case law above, although the Leegin Court 
rejected the per se rule for all vertical restraints, plaintiffs have 
identified an approach that allows them to utilize the rule by proving 
that a vertical restraint is merely a pretext for a horizontal 
agreement.
312
 This technique has offered some success to plaintiffs 
alleging that vertical restraints constitute antitrust violations. 
Nonetheless, this has not saved vertical restraints from per se legality 
because courts are reluctant, as seen in Spahr and Mack, to 
overextend this exception to all situations that exhibit both vertical 
 
 303. Id. at *7. 
 304. Id. at *7–8. 
 305. 530 F.3d 204, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 306. Id. at 218–19. 
 307. Id. at 209–10. 
 308. Id. at 218–19. 
 309. Id. at 221. 
 310. Id. at 225. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Sullivan & Linder, supra note 266, at 70. 
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and horizontal undercurrents unless there is unambiguous evidence 
of horizontal conspiracy. In effect, this has limited the number of 
situations in which pleading horizontal conspiracy is a viable 
strategy for plaintiffs, and as vertical enforcement continues its 
decline into per se legality under the rule of reason, serious 
implications arise if illegal horizontal conduct is masquerading as 
vertical conduct. 
C.  Hitting the Wall: 
Plaintiffs’ Difficulty 
Overcoming Economic Analyses 
For the few plaintiffs fortunate enough to survive the pleading 
stages of an antitrust claim, the challenge is far from over. In order to 
win an antitrust claim under the rule of reason, the plaintiff must first 
convince the court that the anticompetitive consequences of the 
restraint outweigh the procompetitive benefits.
313
 When determining 
whether the plaintiff has met this burden the court must undertake an 
in-depth economic analysis of the restraint, the relevant market, and 
the industry as a whole.
314
 A constantly evolving economic market 
and ever-changing business realities complicate economic 
analyses.
315
 Courts cannot employ a bright-line rule because the 
economy is so dynamic that the impact of a restriction can vary 
immensely within a particular market over time.
316
 
The fact that the strength of antitrust enforcement has fluctuated 
with the political climate of the time further complicates the 
precision of courts’ economic analyses.
317
 Much to the dismay of 
antitrust scholars, political biases have, over time, led courts to 
become less suspicious of vertical restraints’ anticompetitive 
effects.
318
 This decrease in skepticism, in conjunction with the 
 
 313. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1385–86. 
 314. Id. 
 315. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1600–10 (discussing the impact that the 
advent of the internet has had on doing business). 
 316. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 905 (2007). The Court 
explained that it is important that “our antitrust doctrines ‘evolve with new circumstances and 
new wisdom.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
 317. See PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 2. 
 318. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 877; see also Saami Zain, Quanta 
Leap or Much Ado About Nothing? An Analysis on the Effect of Quanta v. LG Electronics, 20 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 67, 115 (2010) (“In recent times, however, courts and commentators have 
grown less suspicious of vertical restraints, and specifically, whether they are likely to be 
anticompetitive.”). 
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Supreme Court’s concern for producing too many false positives,
319
 
prompted the Court to switch from per se illegality to the rule of 
reason in Sylvania and Leegin.
320
 But recently, skepticism has 
surfaced as to whether courts are able to properly weigh the 
competitive impact of vertical restraints under the rule of reason. If, 
in practice, the courts never find that anticompetitive effects 
outweigh procompetitive justifications, a real concern arises that 
courts are not conducting proper economic analyses. 
1.  Operating on Uncertainty: 
Can Courts Properly 
Evaluate Economic Impact? 
The courts’ ability to conduct an accurate economic analysis and 
correctly predict how business practices will influence competition is 
essential to effective antitrust enforcement.
321
 In Leegin, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that the lower courts did not have adequate 
experience weighing the procompetitive and anticompetitive impacts 
of resale price maintenance.
322
 In fact, the Court implied that this 
was one of its primary reasons for overturning the per se standard 
and implementing the rule of reason instead.
323
 In order to conduct 
an effective economic analysis, courts must possess “the ability to 
understand, apply, and explain microeconomics and industrial 
organization theory . . . to . . . specific real-world situation[s].”
324
 
Unfortunately, courts typically are not equipped with the skills 
needed to identify the actual economic impact, and the nature of the 
adversarial system only complicates matters more so.
325
 
 
 319. A false positive occurs when a court finds conduct that does not actually harm 
competition to be anticompetitive. False positives typically arise as the result of over enforcement 
and per se rules. See Wright, supra note 16, at 3 n.10 (stating that an example of a false positive 
would be when a firm is falsely accused of an antitrust violation); see also Harbour, supra note 
29, at 15 (referring to false positives as “Type I” errors). 
 320. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1407–08. 
 321. Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Improving Competitive Analysis, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 805, 
805–06 (2009). 
 322. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 551 U.S. at 894–98. 
 323. See id. 
 324. Lipsky, supra note 321, at 806. 
 325. Id. (“[J]udges are almost never appointed based on their credentials as 
microeconomists.”); see also Stucke, supra note 10, at 1440 (“Weighing a particular restraint’s 
competitive benefits and harms, however, is often beyond the litigants’, [and] the judiciary’s . . . 
capacity.”). 
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a.  Complications in appraising 
the value of a restraint’s 
procompetitive justifications 
Over time, courts have accumulated limited experience in 
performing accurate economic and competitive analyses but have not 
fully developed the ability to understand real-world markets or 
predict future competitive effects.
326
 Indeed, as one antitrust scholar 
noted: 
Economists, much less judicial fact-finders, are ill-equipped 
to quantify the value of different forms of competition, such 
as inter- and intrabrand competition, static versus dynamic 
efficiency, and a restraint’s impact on that competition. 
Even if such weighing were feasible, no consensus exists on 
the relative weights for each factor. In certain industries, 
society may seek to promote innovation (dynamic 
efficiency) more than lower prices (static efficiency). 
Moreover, the weighing ignores the distributional effects of 
the challenged restraint . . . [because] the fact-finder does 
not consider whether one group bears the brunt of 
anticompetitive effects over time.
327
 
Partly, this inexperience can be attributed to the fact that earlier 
antitrust cases rarely required such an in-depth economic analysis as 
is presently required.
328
 Further, courts have dismissed many cases 
for failure to state a claim before they have actually performed an 
economic analysis, and in the few cases that survive motions to 
dismiss, the parties often settle before the court conducts its 
analysis.
329
 Additionally, courts have not explicated which policy 
considerations should trump others when weighing a restraint’s 
effects on competition.
330
 
If courts are overvaluing the procompetitive benefits and 
undervaluing the anticompetitive harms of vertical restraints, there is 
a real concern that they are not balancing the competitive impacts 
accurately. In particular, courts may be giving too much weight to 
arguments that vertical restraints are permissible because they have 
 
 326. Lipsky, supra note 321, at 806. 
 327. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1442. 
 328. Lipsky, supra note 321, at 805–06. 
 329. Id. at 805; see discussion supra Part III.A. 
 330. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1441. 
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the potential to promote interbrand competition and combat free 
riders.
331
 If these justifications are not as persuasive as the Court has 
deemed, the rule of reason is groundlessly excusing anticompetitive 
restraints. 
i.  Undervaluing the benefit 
of intrabrand competition 
Traditionally, economists have neglected to investigate the 
competitive significance of intrabrand competition.
332
 The Supreme 
Court has openly proclaimed that promoting interbrand, and not 
intrabrand, competition is the “primary concern of antitrust law.”
333
 
The result seems to be that courts have chosen to overlook the 
consequences that arise from limiting intrabrand competition based 
on the assumption that the increase in interbrand competition is more 
desirable.
334
 But this apathy toward intrabrand competition may be 
misguided, and eliminating intrabrand competition may not be as 
benign as economists have conventionally believed.
335
 
Intrabrand competition encourages entities at the same level of 
distribution to compete for sales margins and market shares, which 
eventually leads to lower prices for consumers.
336
 This is not to say 
that the need for intrabrand competition will always negate an 
increase in interbrand competition, but it is certainly a consideration 
that courts need to delve into more deeply than they have in the 
superficial investigations they have conducted in the past.
337
 A 
blanket statement that interbrand competition outweighs intrabrand 
competition is dangerous because it distracts courts from evaluating 
the actual market impact of intrabrand competition. 
 
 331. See Harbour, supra note 29, at 11–14 (explaining how the Chicago School’s views often 
undervalue or ignore the anticompetitive effects of eliminating intrabrand competition); Lao, 
supra note 165, at 512 (questioning the extent of the free-rider problem). 
 332. See Harbour, supra note 29, at 10–11. 
 333. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (citing Cont’l T. 
V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977)). 
 334. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895–96 (2007); 
Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 724–25; Cont’l T. V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 51–52 & 52 n.19. 
 335. Harbour, supra note 29, at 13–14. 
 336. Id. at 4–5, 12. 
 337. See id. at 11. 
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ii.  Overestimating the 
prevalence of free riding 
Likewise, procompetitive justifications that vertical restraints 
fight free riders may be as blindly glorified as the importance of 
interbrand competition.
338
 When purchasing goods, consumers often 
value, and are prepared to pay more for, services such as in-store 
salespersons, live dealer demonstrations, and attractive storefronts.
339
 
Therefore, manufacturers usually desire that their retailers provide 
those additional services to customers during the sale of their 
products, and, in turn, their retailers charge consumers higher 
prices.
340
 Free riding occurs when, after using one retailer’s services, 
consumers ultimately purchase the product at a lower price from 
another retailer who does not provide those services.
341
 For example, 
a consumer may go to an expensive retail store offering live 
demonstrations to research a product but then go to a discount 
warehouse to purchase it. In this example, the warehouse would be 
“free riding” on the services provided by the retail store. Free riding 
is a problem because it eliminates retailers’ incentive to offer the 
services altogether.
342
 In the end, consumers and manufacturers 
suffer because retailers cease to offer the services or discontinue the 
sale of the product.
343
 
Proponents of vertical price fixing are adamant that it decreases 
the prevalence of free riding.
344
 Resale price fixing ensures that a 
discount retailer—the free rider—does not undercut the price of a 
retailer selling the same product and offering additional services, 
thereby eliminating the motivation for consumers to buy the product 
from the discount retailer.
345
 However, many economists oppose this 
argument, and there is virtually no empirical evidence demonstrating 
that free riding is as rampant as the supporters of vertical price fixing 
claim.
346
 In fact, free riding may materialize only in the sale of 
expensive or complex products—products that require some sort of 
 
 338. Lao, supra note 165, at 478–79. 
 339. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1606–07. 
 340. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 608–09. 
 341. See, e.g., Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1614–15. 
 342. Id. at 1607. 
 343. See id. 
 344. See id. at 1606. 
 345. See, e.g., id. at 1607. 
 346. Lao, supra note 165, at 478–79 (citing to, among others, antitrust scholars Robert 
Pitofsky, Kevin Arquit, and Stanley Ornstein). 
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interaction with a salesperson.
347
 Yet there are a multitude of 
everyday products that do not require services of any sort and, as 
such, are not susceptible to free riding but remain subject to price 
maintenance nonetheless.
348
 If economists cannot agree about the 
extent of free riding or whether it is actually a legitimate reason for 
restraining trade, how can we expect the courts to make a judgment 
call about its impact? 
b.  Battling experts, high costs, 
and other deficiencies of 
the adversarial system 
To complicate matters even more, the lower courts have been 
exposed to economic analysis only in the context of adversarial 
proceedings.
349
 During litigation, parties present customers and 
documents that support their position with respect to the challenged 
restraint.
350
 Furthermore, “motivated advocates,” including lawyers 
and experts, assert economic theories supporting their position with 
“towering confidence,” often forgoing unbiased reflection and 
impartial explanations.
351
 
When courts are asked to determine a restraint’s impact on 
competition, they typically turn to “neoclassical economic theories,” 
which are based upon the assumption that “profit-maximizing market 
participants pursue their economic self-interest with perfect 
knowledge and willpower.”
352
 Unfortunately, actual behavior rarely 
coincides with theoretical behavior.
353
 Individuals do not have a 
“perfect knowledge” of economics, and no single definition of 
perfect competition exists because it varies so greatly across different 
product markets.
354
 Because of the disparity among economists, the 
trials result in a “battle of the experts,”
355
 as the parties retain experts 
to demonstrate the so-called actual impact of the challenged 
 
 347. Id. at 479 (giving examples of advanced audio and video equipment as a complex 
products). 
 348. Id. at 479–80 (describing products that do not require services but remain subject to price 
fixing to include “boxed candy, pet foods, jeans, vitamins, shampoo, [etc]”). 
 349. See Lipsky, supra note 321, at 806. 
 350. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1427. 
 351. Lipsky, supra note 321, at 806. 
 352. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1426. 
 353. Id. at 1426–27. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Kelly, supra note 4, at 640. 
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restraint.
356
 However, this approach carries some serious infirmities. 
First, these experts rarely have practical work experience in the 
industry at issue and thus base their testimonies not on actual 
business realities but on theoretical economics.
357
 Furthermore, the 
court is then asked to evaluate each party’s skewed position based on 
only its basic and limited understanding of economics to determine 
which theory it believes is more likely to be accurate.
358
 
Of course, the trial judge can mitigate the potential for error by 
scrutinizing an expert’s testimony before it is presented to ensure that 
it has a reliable foundation and is relevant to the economic 
analysis.
359
 However, “judges are almost never appointed based on 
their credentials as microeconomists” and their understanding of 
valid economic theories is limited.
360
 Additionally, judges are often 
able to dictate the outcome of a case being decided under the rule of 
reason by relying on their subjective biases.
361
 Granting judges the 
ability to foreclose or insist upon the admittance of expert testimony 
only augments their tendency to “jealously guard their 
prerogative[s]” by allowing them to decide what theories will be 
entertained at trial.
362
 In this way, judges may exclude from 
consideration any testimony that would be contrary to their 
interests.
363
 Thus, judges may not be able to adequately fulfill their 
role as gatekeepers in antitrust cases. 
Another obstacle that plaintiffs commonly encounter with the 
judicial system is the high cost of litigation.
364
 The Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that antitrust cases are particularly protracted and 
expensive, especially when the rule of reason applies.
365
 This is 
 
 356. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1427. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Kelly, supra note 4, at 640; Stucke, supra note 10, at 1427. 
 359. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). 
 360. Lipsky, supra note 321, at 806. 
 361. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 362. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in 
Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 617, 621 (2005). 
 363. Id. 
 364. Kelly, supra note 4, at 636. 
 365. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1461–62 (citing to Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 558–59 (2007); Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
289 (1985); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)); see also Kelly, 
supra note 4, at 636 (explaining that because discovery and other pre-trial costs are extremely 
expensive in rule of reason cases, plaintiffs are often prompted to forgo filing a suit altogether or 
to settle early on). 
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directly attributable to the fact-intensive nature of the economic 
analysis required by the rule of reason.
366
 The high cost of litigation 
causes some anxiety because, as one scholar noted, “if it is too costly 
to vindicate one’s legal rights, the law is majestic in theory, but 
impractical in reality.”
367
 Consequently, plaintiffs will think twice 
about pursuing a suit when they perceive that the costs will outweigh 
the benefits, causing an already wavering level of enforcement to 
plummet even further.
368
 
2.  Picking and Choosing: 
The Court Recognizes Change, 
but Ignores Reality 
Since the Sherman Act’s inception in 1890, business practices 
have changed, perhaps most significantly due to the emergence of 
the Internet and discount wholesaler chains.
369
 While the Court in 
Leegin did not directly address why courts could not perform an 
adequate competitive analysis, the underlying theme was that 
because the economic realities have changed dramatically over the 
last century, the anticompetitive harm was no longer as apparent as it 
once had been.
370
 The Court, however, neglected to consider how 
these constantly evolving economic and business dynamics might 
only further confuse courts about how to conduct an accurate 
economic analysis. It is thus necessary to understand how these 
changes impact business before evaluating their effects on courts’ 
economic analyses. 
a.  Emergence of the Internet 
There is no doubt that the Internet has changed the way that 
people do business. Businesses have increasingly relied on the 
Internet to conduct day-to-day operations, including advertising, 
customer services, sales transactions, and communications.
371
 
Between 2002 and 2007, Internet sales increased by over 23 percent 
each year while total retail sales increased by only 5 percent each 
 
 366. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1462. 
 367. Id. at 1460. 
 368. See id. 
 369. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1600–01. 
 370. See id. 
 371. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, E-STATS: E-COMMERCE 2009 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/econ/estats/2009/2009reportfinal.pdf. 
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year.
372
 The Internet is particularly appealing to consumers because 
they are no longer constrained to shopping during store hours or to 
purchasing from retailers within their geographic locations.
373
 As a 
result, they have greater access to more shopping options than ever 
before.
374
 Accordingly, consumers have more opportunities to obtain 
lower prices or purchase unusual goods.
375
 
Nevertheless, the Internet has become one of the most 
troublesome issues for businesses seeking to impose vertical 
restrictions today.
376
 Specifically, the Internet poses new and 
worrisome challenges to manufacturers due to the ease with which 
consumers can access pricing information for competing goods.
377
 
Internet retailers are more often thought to free ride on brick-and-
mortar retailers because they have lower overhead costs, offer lower 
prices, and generally do not offer the same services that brick-and-
mortar stores do.
378
 As a result, the accessibility provided by the 
Internet is a major reason why vertical price fixing has become a 
more desirable business practice for manufacturers in recent years.
379
 
While price is not consumers’ sole concern when making 
purchases—picking trustworthy retailers has proven to be an 
important consideration—Internet shoppers are particularly price 
aware.
380
 Due to the availability of product information online, 
consumers have changed their shopping habits.
381
 Today, consumers 
often research products on the Internet before purchasing them from 
a retail store.
382
 As a result, retail storefronts and customer service 
have become less important to consumers’ decisions to purchase.
383
 
Unfortunately for rivaling retailers, Internet accessibility enables 
users to compare prices among retailers more easily, which has the 
 
 372. Lao, supra note 165, at 483. 
 373. Id. at 485–86. 
 374. See id. 
 375. Id. at 485. The lack of geographic restraints is particularly beneficial to “consumers 
living in communities without sufficient population to support a robust local retail market” and 
“buyers with less common needs.” Id. 
 376. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1601. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Lao, supra note 165, at 482. 
 379. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1601. 
 380. Id. at 1613–14. 
 381. Id. 
 382. Lao, supra note 165, at 493. 
 383. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1614. 
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potential to harm competition in numerous ways.
384
 First, it can 
cause an increase in free riders.
385
 Second, it can improve the ability 
of retail cartel participants to monitor other cartel participants
386
 
because price cutting becomes more obvious.
387
 Finally, it increases 
the strength of horizontal relationships when manufacturers decide to 
sell online instead of solely through retailers.
388
 
The ease of comparing prices directly correlates to the 
prevalence of free riding.
389
 The Internet encourages free riding 
because consumers who desire a high level of customer service can 
merely visit the brick-and-mortar store before returning home to 
locate the lowest price among online retailers.
390
 Consumers are no 
longer geographically constrained and can easily peruse numerous 
retailers for the best deal without the hassle of driving from store to 
store.
391
 However, the belief that the Internet encourages free riding 
on brick-and-mortar retailers is controversial—and recent studies 
have yielded results indicating that free riding is occurring in the 
opposite direction more frequently.
392
 Due to the volume of 
information accessible via the Internet, consumers may research a 
product over the Internet before travelling to the brick-and-mortar 
 
 384. See id. at 1612. 
 385. Id. at 1612, 1615; see Lao, supra note 165, at 482. 
 386. “Cartels are associations of firms that restrict output or set prices. They may divide 
markets geographically, allocate customers, rig bids at auctions, or restrict nonprice terms. They 
have often been formed with the participation or support of state actors.” MARGARET C. 
LEVENSTEIN & VALERIE Y. SUSLOW, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS ONLINE 
(Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 387. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1612, 1617–18. 
 388. Id. at 1612, 1618–19. 
 389. Id. at 1615. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Lao, supra note 165, at 488–89. 
 392. Id. at 476. However, some economists believe that even if brick-and-mortar stores do 
free ride on Internet retailers, the cost of free riding is more detrimental to brick-and-mortar 
retailers than to online retailers. See Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1615–16 
(explaining that Internet retailers have fixed costs while brick-and-mortar stores’ costs are 
variable and depend on the cost of employing sales associates and the investment of maintaining 
a physical storefront). This is because consumers are always forced to pay full price at brick-and-
mortar stores regardless of whether the consumer desires the services or benefits from the 
services. See The Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act: Do We Need to Restore the Ban on 
Vertical Price Fixing?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antirust, Competition Policy And 
Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 141 (2010) [hereinafter 
Hearings] (statement of James Wilson, Chairman, Antitrust Section of the Am. Bar Ass’n) 
(explaining that “while some services may benefit consumers as well as manufacturers, other 
services provide little or no benefit to consumers even though resale price maintenance can be 
expected to elevate the price that some consumers pay”). 
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store to purchase it.
393
 Research also indicates that free riding can be 
synergistic—simultaneously benefitting both brick-and-mortar and 
Internet retailers—in that as internet shoppers utilize the services of a 
brick-and-mortar store, they create an appearance of a more crowded 
store, which increases other shoppers’ desires to purchase a product 
from that store and drives up the total sales of the store.
394
 
Another concern with Internet accessibility is that the Internet 
encourages an increase in manufacturer and retail cartels.
395
 An 
essential feature of successful cartels is the ability to detect when 
parties are not in compliance with the agreement.
396
 Because prices 
are so readily available on the Internet, manufacturers and retailers 
can monitor price cutting behavior almost effortlessly, thereby 
increasing their ability to overesee retail and manufacturer cartels.
397
 
A final concern is that the Internet encourages retail cartels to form 
as manufacturers vertically integrate themselves into the chain of 
distribution.
398
 Selling products via the Internet requires much fewer 
capital and upkeep costs, and, therefore, manufacturers may find 
establishing an Internet retail front to be a valuable business tactic.
399
 
Once a manufacturer decides to sell through its own website, it can 
engage in price fixing behavior with its retailers much more easily by 
preventing them from making Internet sales or by requiring them to 
sell at its set price.
400
 
It is obvious that the Internet has changed the way people do 
business, but how it has affected competition is unclear. Therefore, 
how the courts should evaluate the impact the Internet has had on 
vertical restraints in an economic analysis is not intuitive. The 
Supreme Court could have addressed how the Internet might 
influence an economic analysis in Leegin, but instead it chose to 
leave this question unanswered—ensuring that the courts remain ill-
equipped to weigh economic impacts. 
 
 393. Lao, supra note 165, at 490–91. 
 394. Id. at 476. 
 395. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1617. 
 396. Id. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. at 1618. 
 399. See Lao, supra note 165, at 482; Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1611–12. 
 400. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1618. 
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b.  Discount retailers’ dominance 
In recent decades, the retail industry has been significantly 
altered by the emergence of discount retailing and by the significant 
rise in the prominence of discount retail chains,
401
 such as Wal-Mart, 
Target, and Costco.
402
 Since the first discount store was established 
in the 1950s, discount retailers have grown substantially and now 
dominate the retail market.
403
 The public has been extremely 
skeptical of the impact of these chains, and exactly how these 
discount retailers have impacted the economy and competition is 
uncertain.
404
 Studies demonstrate that when a chain store enters the 
market, it renders roughly 50 percent of the single-firm discount 
stores unprofitable.
405
 However, due to modeling difficulties, few 
empirical studies have been able to establish the precise impact of 
dominant retail chains.
406
 
 
 401. A discount retailer can be defined as “a departmentalized retail establishment that makes 
use of self-service techniques to sell a large variety of hard goods and soft goods at uniquely low 
margins.” Panle Jia, What Happens When Wal-Mart Comes to Town: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Discount Retailing Industry, 76 ECONOMETRICA 1263, 1264 (2008). 
 402. Id. 
 403. See id. at 1263–64; see also Company Dossier: Costco Wholesale Corporation, 
LEXISNEXIS, http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.linus.lmu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&sfi= 
AC02NBCmpDosSrch (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (stating that Costco is the largest wholesale-
club operator in the United States); Company Dossier: Target Corporation, LEXISNEXIS, http://0-
www.lexisnexis.com.linus.lmu.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&sfi=AC02NBCmpDosSrch (last 
visited Nov. 13, 2011) (stating that Target is the United States’s second-top discount retail chain); 
Company Dossier: Wal-Mart Stores Inc., LEXISNEXIS, http://0-www.lexisnexis.com.linus.lmu 
.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/?shr=t&sfi=AC02NBCmpDosSrch (last visited Nov. 13, 2011) (stating 
that Wal-Mart is the world’s top retailer). 
 404. See Jia, supra note 401, at 1264–65. 
 405. See id. at 1266. This can be attributed to a decline in customer demand for the higher 
priced product. Raymond Deneckere et al., Demand Uncertainty, Inventories, and Resale Price 
Maintenance, 11 Q. J. ECON. 885, 911 (1996). Discounters are able to charge lower prices 
because they are less likely to be stuck with unsold merchandise. Id. As retailers lose customers 
to discount retailers, they are forced to increase their markups, which inevitably leads to even 
more unsold merchandise and basically destroys customer demand for the marked-up products. 
Id. 
 406. Jia, supra note 401, at 1265. “‘[A] mathematical model is a description of a process or a 
prediction about the end result of a process, expressed as an equation’ or set of equations.” 
Matthew W. Swinehart, Remedying Daubert’s Inadequacy in Evaluating the Admissibility of 
Scientific Models Used in Environmental-Tort Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2008) 
(quoting ORRIN H. PILKEY & LINDA PILKEY-JARVIS, USELESS ARITHMETIC: WHY 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENTISTS CAN'T PREDICT THE FUTURE 24 (2007)). When there are too many 
variables in an equation, it becomes impossible to get an answer; therefore, if economists want to 
quantify economic impact through algorithms, they often have to make assumptions that cause 
certain variables to remain constant. Id. at 1288–93. However, these assumptions usually do not 
reflect real market conditions, and as a result, they can yield erroneous, sometimes even useless, 
numerical results. Id. The term “modeling difficulties” refers to these inaccuracies. Id. 
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If economists cannot pinpoint the impact that these retail chains 
are having on businesses, courts certainly are not better suited to 
making that determination. Yet, once again, the Supreme Court 
overlooked this problem, refused to identify how it might influence 
courts’ analyses under the rule of reason, and left lower courts to find 
their own solutions.
407
 Furthermore, because the Court realized that 
the lowers courts would likely be confused when evaluating the 
impact of retail chains, it cannot use its ignorance as an excuse for its 
failure to provide a framework for incorporating that impact into an 
economic analysis. In fact, during oral argument in Leegin, Justice 
Scalia acknowledged that discount retailers could be concerned with 
suffering from the economic implications of switching from per se 
illegality to the rule of reason.
408
 However, Justice Scalia quickly, 
and perhaps misguidedly, dismissed this as a nonissue because, in his 
own words, if the discount retailers had a real gripe, “they would 
have been here.”
409
 
The Supreme Court was clearly correct when it said that both 
the economy and the way people conduct business have evolved 
since the Sherman Act’s inception in 1890. However, when the Court 
defaulted to the rule of reason without providing additional guidance 
about how to conduct an appropriate economic analysis in light of 
these changes, it made a costly error—one that vertical-restraint 
plaintiffs are still paying for. 
3.  It All Comes Down to Politics: 
Subjective Bias as the Deciding Factor 
Washington defines antitrust policy in two ways: the first is by 
interpreting and providing guidance on the laws made by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC), and the second is by enforcing cases filed by the DOJ and 
 
 407. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 408. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1459. 
 409. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 967030, at *31–32). Scalia noted that discount 
retailers—the Wal-Marts and the Targets—did not file amicus briefs and claimed that if they 
were really concerned about losing profits they would have petitioned as amici. Id. This comment 
raises an additional concern in that Justice Scalia seems to be encouraging rent seeking in future 
cases by stating that if businesses decline to petition the Court when their profitability is at issue 
in a case, they are essentially disclaiming any adverse economic impact. Id. at 1457–60 
(discussing concerns of an increase in rent seeking behavior under the rule of reason). 
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FTC.
410
 In addition, because the president appoints DOJ prosecutors 
and FTC commissioners,
411
 a change in presidential administration 
can greatly influence antitrust enforcement, which is usually clear 
from the cases that the different administrations bring—or fail to 
bring.
412
 This strong political influence creates a concern that an 
administration may not implement the laws faithfully because it has 
too much discretion to decide what conduct will be prohibited or 
permitted.
413
 Thus, an administration’s failure to enforce certain 
restraints can contribute to a standard of per se legality. 
Different administrations have used antitrust enforcement to 
promote their own political objectives since the Reagan 
administration, when enforcement politics began to infiltrate 
enforcement schemes.
414
 Before Reagan took office, the Republican 
Party predominantly endorsed antitrust enforcement, as reflected by 
the continuity with which the Republican and Democratic 
administrations had previously enforced the antitrust laws.
415
 During 
the Reagan administration, however, the Republican Party departed 
from “overbearing regulation,” and antitrust enforcement waned.
416
 
Under Reagan, the government actively pursued actions to eliminate 
predatory competitive pricing and price gouging but never 
prosecuted any vertical restraint or monopoly cases.
417
 The 
Republican Party has maintained the laissez-faire attitude it adopted 
during the Reagan administration through the Bush Administration 
until today and, at times, has even been accused of abandoning 
antitrust enforcement altogether given its lax enforcement policies.
418
 
When George W. Bush took office, he promised to enforce 
antitrust laws as forcefully as the Clinton administration had.
419
 This 
 
 410. See Stephen Labaton, Obama Takes Tougher Antitrust Line, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/business/economy/12antitrust.html?pagewanted=all. 
 411. About the Office, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ag/about-oag.html (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2011); Commissioners, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/ 
commissioners/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2011). 
 412. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1448–50. 
 413. Id. at 1450–51. 
 414. Id. at 1448–51. 
 415. Id. at 1450 n.324, 1451 n.326. 
 416. See id. at 1450 n.324. 
 417. Id. at 1452. The sole exception was a monopoly case against AT&T, which the Reagan 
administration settled in 1982. Id.; see United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 
(D.D.C. 1982). 
 418. Id. at 1452–54 & n.337. 
 419. Id. at 1452–53. 
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proclamation, however, proved to be a sham.
420
 Contrary to President 
Bush’s assertion, merger enforcement declined by over 50 percent, 
and the DOJ did not prosecute a single monopoly case against a 
dominant firm during his administration.
421
 This caused great 
dissatisfaction among the “press, antitrust scholars, politicians, and 
practitioners.”
422
 One antitrust scholar even commented that the 
Bush Administration’s guidelines for enforcement were a “brief for 
defendants.”
423
 As previously noted, this statement has proven to be 
somewhat accurate as defendants rarely, if ever, lost antitrust cases 
judged according to the rule of reason during the Bush 
Administration.
424
 Furthermore, it was under President Bush’s 
administration that the Court took the final step in relaxing vertical 
enforcement by extending the rule of reason to vertical price 
fixing.
425
 When antitrust enforcement seriously favors defendants, 
inadvertently defaulting to per se legality becomes a real concern. 
Now with President Obama at the helm, antitrust enforcement 
agencies seem to be taking a tougher stance on anticompetitive 
practices. The discrepancy between the different political agendas of 
the Bush and Obama administrations and its impact on antitrust 
enforcement may be most apparent in the actions taken by the DOJ 
when Obama took office. In 2008, at the end of the Bush 
Administration, the DOJ issued guidelines on how to enforce 
predatory conduct by dominant firms.
426
 The guidelines 
memorialized the Bush Administration’s approach to enforcement
427
 
and were condemned by the FTC as “a blueprint for radically 
weakened enforcement.”
428
 Then, only a few months after the DOJ 
 
 420. Id. at 1453. 
 421. Senator Barack Obama, Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American Antitrust 
Institute (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/aai-%20Presidential 
%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf; see also Labaton, supra note 410 
(“During the Bush Administration, the Justice Department did not file a single case against a 
dominant firm for violating the antimonopoly law.”). 
 422. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1453–54 & n.337–40. 
 423. Labaton, supra note 410 (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp). 
 424. Lao, supra note 165, at 508. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
 425. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (subjecting 
all vertical restraints to a rule of reason analysis). 
 426. Steven Pearlstein, Antitrust Challenges for the Obama Administration, WASH. POST 
(May 17, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/15/ 
AR2009051502920.html. 
 427. Labaton, supra note 410 (quoting an unnamed FTC commissioner). 
 428. Id. 
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implemented the guidelines, the Obama administration took over the 
executive branch, and the DOJ rescinded those very guidelines.
429
 
Currently, the Obama administration has maintained the level of 
enforcement that the Bush Administration claimed it would 
pursue.
430
 The resurgence of enforcement under Obama is based on 
the belief that the Bush Administration disregarded the ultimate 
goals of antitrust law by implementing a policy that “effectively 
straightjacket[ed]” antitrust enforcement agencies and courts trying 
to rectify antitrust injuries, thereby allowing all but the “most bold 
and predatory conduct” to go unregulated.
431
 The Obama 
administration has voiced a particular concern with this approach in 
light of the recent economic downturn and the importance of 
vigorously enforcing antitrust laws during economic crises.
432
 Up to 
this point, Obama’s administration has demonstrated an attitude 
geared toward revamping vertical enforcement as well.
433
 It has 
voiced its support for legislation aimed at overturning Leegin and 
reverting to the per se treatment of minimum vertical price fixing.
434
 
While the extent to which the change in the presidential 
administration will strengthen vertical enforcement is still unclear, 
Obama has indicated a commitment to a more rigorous approach 
than that taken under President Bush, which may help to save 
vertical price fixing from per se legality.
435
 
However, the executive branch is not the only branch of 
government that makes decisions based upon its political platforms, 
and thus plaintiffs should remain wary when seeking private 
enforcement.
436
 Courts, including the Supreme Court, are not 
isolated from partisanship: Supreme Court justices are appointed by 
the executive branch and generally support their party’s political 
platforms during their tenure.
437
 Increasingly, business lobbyists are 
 
 429. Pearlstein, supra note 426. 
 430. Labaton, supra note 410 (discussing how Obama’s “new enforcement policy reverses the 
Bush administration’s approach”). 
 431. Id. (quoting Christine Varney, former Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice). 
 432. Id. 
 433. Quentin R. Wittrock & Jeremy L. Johnson, Can Franchisors Control Franchisee 
Prices?, 28 FRANCHISE L.J. 199, 243 (2009). 
 434. Id. 
 435. See id. at 243–44. 
 436. See Stucke, supra note 10, at 1456. 
 437. See id. at 1457 n.356. 
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becoming less concerned with changing legislation, choosing instead 
to turn their efforts toward influencing the courts.
438
 In addition, 
vague standards, like the rule of reason, allow judges to introduce 
their personal ideological and political beliefs into antitrust 
analyses.
439
 
A survey of Supreme Court justices’ voting decisions between 
1937 and 2006 revealed that Republican-appointed justices 
consistently voted more conservatively than Democratic-nominated 
justices.
440
 This trend shows no sign of changing, as more-recent 
appointees have demonstrated an even greater propensity for voting 
according to their political ideologies.
441
 At the conclusion of the 
2007–2008 term, one commentator noticed that the Supreme Court 
followed the example set during recent terms and “once again sided 
in most cases with employers over employees, with big businesses 
over consumers, and with the government over individuals.”
442
 Then 
in 2010 another commentator noted that, in the previous six years, 
the Supreme Court had “become critical (or even somewhat hostile) 
to antitrust, having decided [only] eight antitrust cases—all having 
the effect of [further] weakening antitrust enforcement.”
443
 While 
this deterioration of antitrust enforcement is disquieting for plaintiffs, 
even more alarming is the fact that the Supreme Court heard eighteen 
antitrust cases during the sixteen years between 1993 and 2009 and 
did not rule for the plaintiff in a single one.
444
 
As demonstrated above, the executive branch has the ability to 
dictate the level of antitrust enforcement through appointments to the 
FTC, DOJ, and judiciary, and therefore, an administration’s political 
platforms can have serious repercussions on plaintiffs’ chances of 
prevailing under the antitrust laws.
445
 Thus, de facto per se legality of 
vertical restraints seems more likely to occur under a Republican 
administration, like President Bush’s, than a Democratic 
 
 438. Id. at 1457. 
 439. Id. at 1456. 
 440. Id. at 1457 n.356. 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. at 1458 (quoting Andrew Cohen, Not Your Father’s Court: Andrew Cohen Reviews 
the Decisions and Looks at Trends from the Past Supreme Court Term, CBS NEWS (July 2, 
2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/02/opinion/courtwatch/main4227922.shtml. 
 443. Zain, supra note 318, at 115. Leegin was one of these cases. See Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2006). 
 444. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1458. 
 445. See supra notes 410–444 and accompanying text. 
  
1282 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1225 
administration, like Obama’s. Unfortunately, although it seems 
plaintiffs can take some solace in the Obama administration’s 
resolution to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement, the courts have yet 
to entirely adopt this sentiment, and thus, per se legality remains a 
concern. 
Collectively, the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate a clearer 
standard by which to conduct a competitive analysis, its ignorance of 
the constantly evolving economic and political climates, and the 
inherent deficiencies of the adversarial system have caused courts to 
consistently yield unpredictable results when applying the rule of 
reason.
446
 At least once, the Court itself recognized the high 
likelihood that the rule of reason would produce inconsistent results: 
[A]ntitrust plaintiffs may bring lawsuits throughout the 
Nation in dozens of different courts with different 
nonexpert judges and different nonexpert juries. In light of 
the nuanced nature of the evidentiary evaluations necessary 
to separate the permissible from the impermissible, it will 
prove difficult for those many different courts to reach 
consistent results. And, given the fact-related nature of 
many such evaluations, it will also prove difficult to assure 
that the different courts evaluate similar fact patterns 
consistently. The result is an unusually high risk that 
different courts will evaluate similar factual circumstances 
differently.
447
 
And the outcome of an economic analysis is not the only 
inconsistency under the rule of reason: courts differ as to how many 
steps exist for establishing liability, how encompassing those steps 
are, and which litigant shoulders the burden of proving them.
448
 
Additionally, some courts require plaintiffs to definitively identify 
the relevant market early on, while others bypass this requirement if 
 
 446. Change in Circumstance, supra note 69, at 1620. 
 447. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 281–82 (2007); Stucke, supra 
note 10, at 1423. 
 448. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1432; see also Kelly, supra note 4, at 637 (“[I]t is not perfectly 
clear what criteria the court must use to judge a practice under the rule [of] reason, how each 
criterion should be judged, or how much weight to give each criterion considered.”); id. at 637 
n.331 (explaining that different requirements for demonstrating market power exist among the 
federal circuit courts); see, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); NCAA v. Bd. 
of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Levine v. Cent. Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538 (11th 
Cir. 1996); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 
Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981). 
  
Summer 2012] AN ANTITRUST NARCOTIC 1283 
the plaintiff can prove an actual harm to competition.
449
 Obviously, 
inconsistencies in the law pose significant concerns for businesses 
and plaintiffs alike in that it is very difficult to determine antitrust 
liability prior to litigation.
450
 As former President Woodrow Wilson 
once explained, “Nothing hampers business like uncertainty.”
451
 
Because the economy is not stagnant, the Court deferred to the 
rule of reason, believing it to be a standard flexible enough to 
account for economic changes.
452
 But when the Court neglected to 
explain how to perform an objective economic analysis, it failed to 
gauge the harm that allowing lower courts to incorporate their 
subjective biases into analyses would have on enforcement levels. 
Thus, while the Court may have intended the rule of reason to protect 
competitive ideals by reacting reflexively to economic progress, it 
has inadvertently created a standard that does not react to 
anticompetitive practices at all—per se legality. 
IV.  THE COURT HAS HIT THE 
SNOOZE BUTTON FOR LONG ENOUGH: 
IT IS TIME TO AWAKEN VERTICAL ENFORCEMENT 
By upholding the rule of reason for vertical enforcement, the 
Court refuses to acknowledge the probability that vertical restraints 
tend to injure competition, whether it be by eliminating intrabrand 
competition or by leading to horizontal collusion. In doing so, the 
Court also ignores its own proclamation in Leegin—that the lower 
courts are ill-equipped to sufficiently perform an economic analysis. 
Why, then, did the Court endorse a standard that not only requires 
but also relies entirely upon an economic analysis? 
As courts become progressively more reluctant to find that the 
anticompetitive effects of a restraint outweigh the procompetitive 
benefits, plaintiffs’ successes will continue to dwindle.
453
 
Accordingly, it may only be a matter of time before plaintiffs 
recognize that the cost of litigating vertical restraint cases is not 
 
 449. Stucke, supra note 10, at 1432–33; see also Kelly, supra note 4, at 637 (explaining that 
there is a legal division about whether plaintiffs should be required to demonstrate a defendant’s 
market power). 
 450. Stucke, supra note 10, 1422–23. 
 451. Id. at 1396 (quoting Woodrow Wilson, U.S. President, Address to Joint Session of 
Congress on Trusts & Monopolies (Jan. 20, 1914), (transcript available at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65374). 
 452. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007). 
 453. See supra Part III.C.1.a. 
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worth the risk, thus prompting vertical enforcement to completely 
succumb to a de facto rule of per se legality.
454
 To avoid this fate, the 
Supreme Court must reevaluate the rule of reason’s construction and 
provide a more definitive standard for analyzing vertical restraints. 
This is not to say that the Court should return to a rule of per se 
illegality. Rather, the Court should evaluate the problems that both 
the rule of reason and the per se standards have exposed and, instead, 
endorse a new standard that would avoid those same infirmities and 
allow vertical enforcement to resume an optimum level. 
After accounting for the infirmities of the current standard of 
analysis, the Supreme Court should invoke a rebuttable presumption 
of per se illegality for all vertical restraints. Inherent in this standard 
would be a rebuttable presumption of market power as well. This 
standard forsakes the traditional approach to categorization and 
instead refocuses the courts’ attention on the effect of a restraint.
455
 
While some may be skeptical of the impact that this standard will 
have on precedent, evoking this new standard does not render all of 
the antitrust precedent worthless. Rather, it merely recalibrates the 
weight that courts should give to such precedent—categorization will 
be used as a tool in performing an economic analysis instead of being 
used to determine if an analysis is necessary. 
A rebuttable presumption would still require that a plaintiff 
sufficiently plead the existence of an agreement restraining 
competition, but once this initial burden is satisfied, the complaint 
would carry the assumption that the restraint is unreasonable.
456
 A 
defendant would then be able to refute the plaintiff’s allegation of an 
antitrust violation by proffering evidence that procompetitive 
justifications excuse the restraint before a court decides if the 
practice is anticompetitive.
457
 At this stage of analysis, courts would 
be free to consider the categorical analysis that currently exists: 
restraints which have long been recognized as procompetitive should 
require the defendant to produce less evidence of reasonableness, 
while those more controversial restraints should be evaluated based 
upon their actual effect and not an arbitrary designation.
458
 In doing 
 
 454. See supra notes 359–363 and accompanying text. 
 455. See Kelly, supra note 4, at 644–45. 
 456. See Lao, supra note 165, at 511. 
 457. Kelly, supra note 4, at 644–45. 
 458. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 14, at 1269 (explaining that categories can be helpful to 
an economic analysis but should not be dispositive of the outcome). 
  
Summer 2012] AN ANTITRUST NARCOTIC 1285 
so, courts should assign less deference to practices that rouse 
horizontal sentiments, such as price fixing, dual distribution, or those 
that strengthen cartels, but should consider practices that have long 
been viewed as beneficial to competition, such as vertical nonprice 
restraints, more leniently.
459
 The upshot is that although categories 
may still factor into a court’s analysis, the emphasis on 
categorization will have shifted from being the utmost priority to 
being one of many factors a court can utilize to predict the actual 
economic impact of the restraint. 
An additional feature of the new standard is a presumption of 
that a manufacturer possesses market power. Market power is often 
an important consideration in determining whether a practice is 
anticompetitive.
460
 However, courts do not agree about how to apply 
or whether to even consider market power in an economic analysis of 
vertical restraints.
461
 The reality is that if a manufacturer has enough 
influence to demand that its retailers consent to a price fixing 
agreement, it must possess market power.
462
 Otherwise, the retailers 
would refuse to comply.
463
 
A.  Categorization: 
What Dreams Are Made of 
or a Complete Nightmare? 
Many scholars agree that the antitrust laws are outdated and 
demand an overhaul, which would consist of abandoning passé 
categorizations and assumptions and increasing reliance on empirical 
evidence to develop a standard that is more relevant to the state of 
the current economy.
464
 Particularly, scholars have argued that the 
once rigid categories of analysis have been manipulated to the extent 
that they fail to depict the current economic realities, and they worry 
that “[b]lind reliance on the categories of yesteryear unnecessarily 
complicates antitrust litigation, creates inaccurate results, and creates 
perverse incentives for American businesses.”
465
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Further frustrating the current enforcement scheme is the weight 
given to classifying restraints as horizontal or vertical, as price or 
nonprice, and as illegal per se or subject to the rule of reason.
466
 
Because categorization is often dispositive, plaintiffs always prefer 
per se treatment while defendants argue that the rule of reason is 
appropriate.
467
 One of the intrinsic problems with this categorical 
characterization is that the courts, not the legislature, created the 
categories and did so by manipulating “case-specific standards en 
masse into categorical rules.”
468
 Unfortunately, the economic effect 
of a restraint will vary under the different circumstances of every 
case, and often, one type of restraint will, in reality, result in the 
economic impact equivalent to a different type of restraint.
469
 Yet, 
the courts do not consider the economic impact before selecting the 
appropriate category,
470
 and courts are reluctant to reclassify vertical 
restraints as horizontal even when they operationally result in the 
same economic impacts as horizontal collusion.
471
 For example, 
courts judge vertical price fixing according to the rule of reason even 
if it tacitly leads to horizontal price fixing.
472
 
If the Court would take note of this breakdown, it would 
recognize the inherent flaws of the antitrust standards as they exist 
today and would find the emphasis on categorical classification to be 
counterproductive. Due to the variance in the economic impact of 
restraints across markets, it is imprudent to create blanket categories 
and strictly adhere to them.
473
 The Court claims that it recognizes the 
danger of basing antitrust analysis on “formalistic line drawing,” but 
nevertheless, that is precisely what it has done by creating and 
emphasizing categorical distinctions.
474
 Effectively, because 
classifying a restraint into a per se category is usually outcome 
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determinative, the current enforcement scheme is faulty because it 
inherently emphasizes the importance of classifying a restraint before 
considering its actual economic impact. Without a doubt, courts 
frequently devote more time to categorizing a restraint than to 
determining its economic impact.
475
 
While completely eliminating the per se rule and rule of reason 
would be the most straightforward way to eliminate the problems 
posed by categorical analysis, the Court is highly unlikely to 
consider doing so given its current makeup. Most likely, the Court 
would fear that it would essentially render all of our antitrust 
precedent useless. Therefore, Congress may need to acknowledge the 
problems inherent in the current enforcement scheme and take 
matters into its own hands by passing a bill that changes the 
standard. Given the unrest in Congress following Leegin’s 
eradication of all per se illegal vertical restraints and the Court’s 
long-standing tradition of outlawing only those restraints that 
unreasonably restrict competition, a rebuttable presumption of 
illegality would be a reasonable solution for the waning vertical 
enforcement. A Congressional bill proposing this solution would 
certainly be an easier sell to legislators than the bills currently urging 
a return to per se illegality. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, 
this approach will not erase all of our antitrust precedent; it will 
merely recalibrate the influence it will have on the outcome of a 
case. 
B.  Caffeine for the Court: 
How a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality 
Will Reenergize Vertical Enforcement 
The primary deficiency of the per se rule was that it yielded too 
many false positives.
476
 Even when procompetitive benefits resulted 
from a vertical restraint on trade, the per se rule did not allow 
defendants to offer any of them as justifications for imposing the 
restraint.
477
 As a result, the Supreme Court has repeatedly voiced its 
concern that the per se approach is inconsistent with its interpretation 
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of the Sherman Act as prohibiting only unreasonable restraints.
478
 
Similarly, the rule of reason is not flawless. As discussed previously, 
the major drawbacks of the rule of reason are that it imposes an 
extremely high burden on plaintiffs, promotes inconsistencies, and 
allows courts to incorporate their own biases into their analyses.
479
 
Collectively, these deficiencies create an even bigger problem for 
enforcement by preventing plaintiffs from prevailing under the rule 
of reason and, in so doing, creating a rule of per se legality. By 
employing a rebuttable presumption of illegality, courts will be able 
to resume an optimal level of vertical enforcement. A rebuttable 
presumption of illegality will remedy four primary problems that the 
current enforcement approach has exposed—accuracy, predictability, 
objectivity, and applicability. 
1.  Increasing the 
Accuracy of Rulings 
First, a standard should yield accuracy so as to minimize 
indications of anticompetitive behavior.
480
 Unfortunately, the current 
enforcement scheme incentivizes plaintiffs and defendants to argue 
for and create false positives and false negatives respectively.
481
 The 
problem with false positives is that restraints that actually promote 
competition and consumer welfare are deemed to be illegal outright 
due to their categorization.
482
 The result of underenforcement has 
been criticized as leading to too few condemnations because conduct 
harmful to competition and consumers too often goes undetected.
483
 
The concern with too many false negatives under the rule of reason is 
exacerbated by the fact that it has proven to operate as a de facto 
pronouncement of per se legality on more than one occasion.
484
 
Plaintiffs and defendants alike should be in a position to win antitrust 
cases, and, as such, the economic impact should be outcome 
determinative, not the categorization of the restraint.
485
 Accuracy 
will reduce false indicators and encourage an optimal level of 
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enforcement—when a standard is accurate, courts can correctly 
identify which restraints are adequately justified, and thus 
reasonable, instead of judging a restraint based on its 
categorization.
486
 
Under the rebuttable-presumption approach, accuracy would 
increase and courts could easily avoid false positives and negatives. 
Unlike the per se standard, the rebuttable-presumption standard 
allows the courts to consider the procompetitive justifications. 
Additionally, in contrast to the rule of reason, it does not impose an 
unfair burden on plaintiffs in the pleading stages—no longer would 
plaintiffs be required to plead an unreasonable restraint on trade or 
the defendant’s market power in their complaints. Perhaps most 
importantly, it eliminates the possibility of miscategorization from 
the outset. Courts would no longer have to agonize over 
categorization before the economic analysis stage, and, even at that 
point, the court would not be limited to putting the restraint in one 
category. Instead, it would be free to consider multiple classifications 
based on the circumstances of the case. 
2.  Improving Predictability 
for Litigants 
It is important that litigants are able to predict what test will be 
applied during litigation.
487
 Uncertainty is unsavory to defendants 
and plaintiffs alike.
488
 Businesses need to be able to predict their 
antitrust liability before imposing a restraint, and plaintiffs should be 
able to gauge the likelihood of success before filing a complaint.
489
 
In order for a standard to be predictable, it must be both consistent 
and transparent. 
Inconsistency poses a problem because litigants should be able 
to anticipate with some degree of certainty how the courts will regard 
any given restraint. Currently, this is not possible because, due to the 
Court’s broad grant of discretion in Leegin, different courts are 
giving contradictory treatment to the same or similar restraints.
490
 
Although the Court has prided itself on the flexibility of the 
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categorical standards, the Court’s ability to shift those categories on 
a whim has led to widespread bewilderment for litigants attempting 
to predict how the Court will rule.
491
 Moreover, as mentioned 
previously, the Court can capriciously change the appropriate 
category of a given restraint.
492
 If truth be told, the only thing courts 
have been seemingly consistent about in recent times is finding no 
antitrust violations in vertical-restraint cases. 
It is also essential that the new standard be transparent so that 
litigants are able to fully understand how the courts will apply it.
493
 
Because of the Court’s grant of discretionary authority in Leegin, 
courts are inconsistent in their application of the rule of reason.
494
 
Leegin allows courts to develop their own methods for determining 
whether a restraint is reasonable—with the only guiding principle 
being that the procompetitive benefits must outweigh the 
anticompetitive harms.
495
 The Court has not opined as to the role that 
market power should play or the credence that courts should give to 
advantageous and adverse economic impacts.
496
 This causes serious 
concern for litigants because they are not sure what approach to take 
when drafting their pleadings.
497
 
Under a rebuttable-presumption standard, consistency and 
transparency will improve because businesses and plaintiffs will 
know which standard courts will apply, and they will be able to plan 
accordingly. All litigants will be on notice that, once the pleading 
burden is satisfied, the presumptions of unreasonableness and market 
power will be imposed and each party will be granted the 
opportunity to argue the merits of the case. Still, even under this 
approach, consistency and transparency may continue to be a 
concern because the courts will still be required to perform an 
economic analysis after the defendant offers procompetitive 
justifications. Under the current approach, however, courts do not 
seem to be making any headway toward consistency or transparency; 
thus, the rebuttable-presumption standard is at least a step in the right 
direction. Since plaintiffs are consistently losing under the rule of 
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reason, a rebuttable presumption of illegality certainly offers to 
improve those odds by giving plaintiffs more opportunity to argue 
the economic impact of the restraint as opposed to its categorical 
designation. 
3.  Forcing Courts to 
Be More Objective 
A third concern is objectivity. An effective standard should 
require objectivity so that a court’s ability to incorporate its 
subjective biases is as limited as possible.
498
 Political biases and 
personal agendas inevitably make their way into a court’s analysis 
when it applies vague standards.
499
 This is demonstrated by the 
Court’s arbitrary creation of categorical analysis based on haphazard 
distinctions.
500
 Instead of focusing on the economic effect of a 
restraint, courts are able to favor parties and dictate outcomes by 
arbitrarily lumping restraints into whichever category will yield the 
desired result.
501
 
Objectivity would improve under the proposed standard because 
a presumption of unreasonableness would eliminate a court’s power 
to inject a subjective opinion of what is reasonable from the outset of 
litigation. Of course, defendants will still have the opportunity to 
rebut the presumption of unreasonableness, but courts will lose their 
power to favor one litigant over another by subjectively selecting the 
“appropriate” mode of analysis in the pleading stage. Although 
personal and political biases may still influence a court’s ultimate 
holding to a certain degree—particularly during the economic 
analysis—at least the parties will have an opportunity to change the 
court’s opinion before dismissal through oral arguments. 
4.  Ensuring Applicability Across 
the Gamut of Vertical Restraints 
Finally, applicability is another important concern in that the 
standard should be universally applicable to all restraints.
502
 As they 
exist now, the categories of analysis have become nonsensical, and 
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they are no longer indicative of economic realities.
503
 Even the 
Supreme Court has recognized the difficulty that courts face when 
determining whether some restraints are vertical or horizontal, price 
or nonprice.
504
 Over time, the once strict categories have become 
muddled, and there is no longer a “bright line” that distinguishes 
whether restraints are subject to the per se rule or the rule of 
reason.
505
 Applicability eliminates the need to immediately 
categorize restraints, thereby removing the opportunity for 
miscategorization. 
A rebuttable presumption will certainly achieve an improvement 
in applicability, for not only will it subject all vertical restraints to 
the same category of analysis, but it will also eliminate the impact of 
illogical distinctions regarding what constitutes vertical and 
horizontal conduct. No longer will courts have to arbitrarily 
distinguish between the types of conduct at hand before delineating 
their economic effects. Dual distribution and price fixing could be 
evaluated by their impact on the market rather than the method used 
to implement them. Applicability cannot get much simpler than this: 
all vertical restraints will be considered unreasonable unless 
otherwise proven. While the depth of the economic analysis may 
vary based on the restraint at hand, both parties will know the test 
that will be applied. 
Skeptics may attempt to argue that the rebuttable presumption 
will increase the cost and frequency of litigation for defendants, 
which would eventually be reflected in higher prices for 
consumers.
506
 While noteworthy, this problem could be mitigated by 
a rule that required the plaintiff to pay for the defendant’s court costs 
and attorney’s fees when the defendant succeeds in demonstrating 
that the procompetitive benefits justify a restraint.
507
 Further, if a 
new standard is put in place, anticompetitive practices—which often 
yield higher prices—should decrease, and the impact on consumer 
prices resulting from increased litigation costs and decreased 
anticompetitive practices would balance each other out. In that way, 
consumer prices should, at the worst, maintain the status quo. 
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Studies have shown that in practice, the rule of reason operates 
as a default rule of legality for vertical nonprice restraints and 
maximum price fixing.
508
 The passage of Leegin indicates that 
maximum vertical pricing will suffer a similar fate. As vertical 
enforcement is rendered obsolete through the application of the rule 
of reason, serious questions arise as to whether the Court has lost 
sight of the original intentions of the Sherman Act. All things 
considered, the rebuttable-presumption approach strikes a fair 
balance between granting plaintiffs a fair opportunity to prevail 
while giving defendants a chance to show that the restraint is 
reasonable by proving that the procompetitive benefits outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects.
509
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has consistently stood by its proclamation 
that the adoption of the rule of reason is consistent with the its 
interpretation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act as prohibiting only 
unreasonable restraints on trade.
510
 However, the Court’s assertion 
that the rule of reason is the appropriate standard for evaluating the 
reasonableness of all vertical restraints is doing a disservice to 
antitrust enforcement. Weak antitrust enforcement can become a 
serious concern, for businesses and consumers in particular, and 
under the rule of reason, weakened vertical enforcement has become 
a reality. Unfortunately, using the rule of reason to determine the 
reasonableness of a restraint operationally results in per se legality. 
Indeed, enforcement levels of vertical nonprice and maximum price 
restraints following Sylvania and Khan confirm that a shift toward 
the rule of reason has eviscerated regulation. 
Lately, the Court has certainly not exercised any reasonable 
restraint of its own in advancing the deregulation of competition by 
extending the rule of reason. Before Leegin, the Court had only 
subjected vertical nonprice and maximum price restraints to the rule 
of reason and had continued to hold minimum vertical price fixing as 
subject to per se illegality. However, in Leegin, the Court could no 
longer resist the urge to finally subject all vertical restraints to the 
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rule of reason. The repercussions on vertical enforcement since 
Leegin have been significant. First, the Court endorsed a heightened 
pleading standard for plaintiffs by increasing the pleading burden on 
plaintiffs in both Twombly and Leegin. Second, the Court’s warning 
that vertical restraints continue to be subjected to the rule of reason 
regardless of their horizontal impacts caused the lower courts to 
become reluctant to distinguish horizontal conduct without palpable 
evidence. Finally, the Court’s failure to provide enough guidance 
about how to conduct an economic analysis using the rule of reason 
created a standard under which it is almost impossible for plaintiffs 
to win any vertical restraint cases. As a consequence, all vertical 
restraints—if they are not there already—are now startlingly close to 
per se legality. 
Throughout the history of antitrust enforcement, the Court has 
been flexible when the circumstances demand that it overturn per se 
rules, but now it insists that the only alternative to per se illegality is 
the rule of reason.
511
 The Supreme Court justices themselves have 
recognized the deficiencies of the rule of reason they created, but 
they choose to sit idly by, crossing their fingers and hoping that the 
lower courts will somehow convert the rule of reason into a workable 
standard.
512
 The time has come for the Court to reconsider whether 
applying the rule of reason when evaluating vertical restraints is 
consistent with the ultimate goals of the antitrust laws. An unbiased 
reflection will reveal that it is not. 
As demonstrated in this Article, the Court has become less 
concerned with protecting consumer welfare and competition in 
recent years, choosing to favor defendants, competitors, big 
businesses, and their own political platforms instead. In effect, they 
have lulled vertical enforcement to sleep. To remedy this misstep, the 
Court needs to provide the lower courts with a new, more clearly 
defined standard by which to evaluate reasonableness, and if the 
Court is unwilling, then Congress must do so. Instituting a rebuttable 
presumption of illegality promises to buttress the original aim of the 
antitrust laws and reinvigorate enforcement while simultaneously 
honoring the Supreme Court’s tradition of prohibiting only 
unreasonable restraints. 
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